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I. INTRODUCTION
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to
a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.1
Those who have experienced the full thrust of the power of government when leveled
against them know that the only protection the citizen has is in the requirement for
a fair trial.2
[I]nvoluntary medication with antipsychotic drugs poses a serious threat to a defendant’s right to a fair trial.3

On July 24, 1998, Russell Weston shot and killed two police
officers, and wounded a third, near a security checkpoint in the
United States Capitol building.4 Reportedly, Weston’s goal was to
gain access to the “override console” of the “ruby satellite system,” a
time machine located in the “great safe of the U.S. Senate,” so that
he could prevent “cannibals” from taking over and spreading “black
heva,” a deadly plague.5 A federal prison psychiatrist diagnosed
Weston as suffering from schizophrenia,6 and the D.C. District

1.
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
2.
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 651 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
3.
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
4.
United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
5.
United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 19-20 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring).
6.
Id. at 11 (per curiam). “Schizophrenia is the paradigmatic illness of psychiatry. It is a
clinical syndrome of variable but profoundly disruptive psychopathology, which involves thought,
perception, emotion, movement, and behavior. The expression of these symptoms varies across
patients and over time, but the cumulative effect of the illness is always severe and usually long
lasting.” Robert W. Buchanan, M.D. & William T. Carpenter, Jr., M.D., Schizophrenia: Introduction and Overview, in KAPLAN & SADOCK’S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1096,
1096 (Benjamin J. Sadock & Virginia A. Sadock eds., 7th ed. 2000).
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Court found him incompetent to stand trial.7 A person is competent
to stand trial so long as he has “sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”8 This competency requirement is based on the
recognition that in an adversary system of justice, it is unfair to
convict someone who is unable to defend himself.9 Although treatment with psychotropic medications10 can sometimes render an in-

7.
Weston, 206 F.3d at 11 (per curiam).
8.
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (quoting statement of the solicitor
general); see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“[A] person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings
against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected
to a trial.”). The prohibition against bringing an incompetent defendant to trial has been traced
to English common law. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 356 (1996) (“The prohibition
against trying the incompetent defendant was well established by the time Hale and Blackstone
wrote their famous commentaries.” (citations omitted)). Federal and state statutes now specify
standards for determining competency to stand trial. See BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO
REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT 293 n.164 (1997) (noting that “Dusky is followed in substance by all jurisdictions, although statutory terminology varies widely”). Incompetence to stand
trial is not synonymous with mental illness; a person can be mentally ill, yet still competent to
stand trial. See Lee v. Alabama, 406 F.2d 466, 471-72 (5th Cir. 1968) (“One may be suffering
from a mental disease . . . and simultaneously have a rational and factual understanding of court
proceedings and be able to consult with a lawyer on a reasonably rational basis.” (citations omitted)).
9.
See Drope, 420 U.S. at 171-72 (noting that “the prohibition [against bringing an incompetent defendant to trial] is fundamental to an adversary system of justice”); see also Caleb
Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 832,
834 (1960) (arguing that “the mentally incompetent defendant, though physically present in the
courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend himself”), quoted in Drope, 420 U.S. at
171.
10. Drugs that are used to treat mental illnesses are called “psychotropic.” See Rennie v.
Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 839 n.2 (3d Cir. 1981) (“The term ‘psychotropic’ medication refers generally
to drugs used in treating psychiatric problems.”). Different kinds of psychotropic drugs are often
referred to in terms of the particular disorder they are used to treat. For example, psychotropic
drugs that are used to treat psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia are usually called “antipsychotic.” See GERALD C. DAVISON & JOHN M. NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 305 (8th ed. 2001)
(noting that schizophrenia can be treated with “medications collectively referred to as antipsychotic drugs”). The effectiveness of all psychotropic medications is limited to alleviating the
symptoms of disorders such as schizophrenia; presently, no pharmacological treatments are
capable of curing mental illnesses. See id. (noting that antipsychotic medications are not a cure);
see also SUSAN NOLEN-HOEKSEMA, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 359-60 (2d ed. 2001) (“People with
schizophrenia typically must take neuroleptic drugs prophylactically—that is, all the time to
prevent new episodes of acute symptoms.”).
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competent detainee competent,11 Weston refused to take these
medications voluntarily.12
For more than three years, the federal courts in the District
of Columbia struggled with the question of whether Weston could
be compelled to take psychotropic medications involuntarily.13 The

11. See United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2001). (“There is treatment
available for Weston’s illness and its symptoms in the form of antipsychotic medication. The
parties agree that such medication is likely the only treatment that can mitigate his schizophrenia and attendant delusions, and thus restore his competence to stand trial.” (citation omitted)).
12. See id. (“Weston is not currently receiving any such [antipsychotic] medication because,
at a time when he was considered medically competent to make a determination, he refused
them.”). Competence to refuse medical treatment is a separate legal issue from competence to
stand trial. Cf. State v. Garcia, 658 A.2d 947, 969 (Conn. 1995) (noting the “unusual circumstance in which a trial court finds that a defendant, although incompetent to stand trial, is competent to make his own health care decisions”). In this Note, the term “competence” refers to
competence to stand trial, unless otherwise indicated.
13. See Weston, 255 F.3d at 873 (affirming district court’s decision); United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (reversing district court’s decision); United
States v. Weston, 194 F.3d 145, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (dismissing appeal when government withdrew opposition to finding detainee incompetent to stand trial); United States v. Weston, 134 F.
Supp. 2d 115, 138 (D.D.C. 2001) (finding involuntary medication justified to decrease dangerousness to others and render detainee competent to stand trial); United States v. Weston, 69 F.
Supp. 2d 99, 118 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding involuntary medication justified to decrease dangerousness to self and others); United States v. Weston, 55 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27 (D.D.C. 1999) (remanding
warden’s decision allowing involuntary medication for further proceedings); United States v.
Weston, 36 F. Supp. 2d 7, 16 (D.D.C. 1999) (granting prosecution’s motion to compel a psychiatric examination of the detainee by a government expert).
“Involuntarily” is used in this Note to mean administered under the authority of the court
without the consent of the detainee, rather than administered with force or following a physical
struggle. Thus, a detainee may take medications cooperatively yet still involuntarily. See Garcia,
658 A.2d at 952 n.8 (“[A]n improper court order with which the defendant complies is no less an
invasion of his rights than physically forcing compliance with such an improper order. . . . [W]e
see no basis, therefore, for distinguishing between forced medication, whereby the defendant is
restrained and injected, and medication pursuant to a court order with which the defendant
complies.”). But see Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 151 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that defendant was not necessarily “forced” to take medication, despite the trial court’s
refusal to allow him to discontinue the medication); United States v. Arena, No. 00CR398(JFK),
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17522, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2001) (“The Court finds the distinction
between involuntary and forced medication significant.”). A gray area does exist when the government initiates medication, yet the detainee does not object. Only a few courts have held that
when the government initiates medication, it thereby assumes the burden of proving that the
medication will not unjustifiably compromise the detainee’s rights. See, e.g., Rickman v. Dutton,
864 F. Supp. 686, 713 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (“Upon its own initiation, the State of Tennessee decided to administer the drugs . . . to [defendant] throughout his trial. Accordingly, the burden
was on the State to demonstrate that the administration of such drugs was medically appropriate, and was essential to promote a compelling State interest.” (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504
U.S. 127, 138 (1992))). Most courts require that a detainee affirmatively object to the medication;
otherwise, the court will assume the detainee took the medication voluntarily. See, e.g., People v.
Jones, 931 P.2d 960, 980 (Cal. 1997) (observing that “the holding in Riggins v. Nevada does not
apply in the present case, because defendant did not refuse the medication and was not forced to
take the antipsychotic drug” (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 127)); Commonwealth v. O’Donnell, 740
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government argued that the medications were necessary both to
prevent Weston from harming himself and others and also to render
Weston competent to stand trial.14 Weston’s attorneys argued that
compelling Weston to take psychotropic medications would violate
Weston’s liberty interest in refusing medical treatment and his
right to a fair trial.15
As Weston’s case illustrates, determining whether to allow
the administration of involuntary psychotropic medications to an
incompetent pretrial detainee requires a court to consider multiple
interests of both the detainee and the government. In the absence of
clear guidance from the Supreme Court,16 lower courts have
reached various conclusions about when the government’s interests
justify compelling a detainee to take psychotropic medications.17
Although preventing a detainee from harming himself or others
generally has been considered sufficient to justify administering
involuntary medications,18 some courts have found that rendering a
detainee competent to stand trial also justifies involuntary medications.19 Other courts, however, have determined that the government’s interest in rendering a detainee competent does not justify
involuntary medications.20 Additionally, some courts have held that
whether involuntary medications will violate a detainee’s right to a

A.2d 198, 210 (Pa. 1999) (“Here, unlike in Riggins, Appellant never moved to suspend the administration of her . . . medication.”).
14. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 116.
15. Id. Commentators have suggested that Weston himself most likely has argued that
medication is not necessary because he is not suffering from a psychological disorder. See, e.g., E.
Fuller Torrey & Mary T. Zdanowicz, Let Us Treat Them Now, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2000, at A23
(“Weston would never take medication voluntarily because he did not believe he was sick. He
really believed—and presumably still believes—that there is a ‘ruby red satellite’ in the U.S.
Capitol that can be used to reverse time.”). This lack of insight is observed in many people with
schizophrenia. See id.; see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 304 (4th ed., text revision 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR] (“A majority of
individuals with schizophrenia have poor insight regarding the fact that they have a psychotic
illness.”).
16. See discussion infra Part II.A.
17. See discussion infra Part II.C.
18. See cases cited infra note 89; see also infra note 24 (discussing government’s interest in
administering involuntary medications to decrease dangerousness).
19. E.g., United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (basing decision to allow involuntary medication solely on the government’s interest in rendering the detainee competent to stand trial); Khiem v. United States, 612 A.2d 160, 168-69 (D.C. 1992) (as amended on
rehearing) (finding that the government’s interest in rendering the detainee competent justified
administering involuntary medications).
20. E.g., Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497, 1511 (D. Utah 1993) (finding that the government’s interest in rendering the detainee competent did not justify administering involuntary
medications); United States v. Santonio, No. 2100-CR-90C, 2001 WL 760932, at *6 (D. Utah May
3, 2001) (same).
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fair trial must be determined before the medications are administered.21 Conversely, some courts have held that involuntary medications may be administered to an incompetent pretrial detainee
without first determining whether the medications will unjustifiably infringe his fair trial rights.22
This Note proposes that the best way to resolve this confusion is for courts to decide that government interests cannot justify
administering involuntary psychotropic drugs to a defendant during
trial. In general, administering involuntary psychotropic drugs infringes an individual’s interest in refusing medical treatment,23 but
can be justified by several government interests, particularly the
interest in preventing the individual from harming himself or others.24 During a trial, however, administering involuntary psychotropic drugs infringes not only the interest in refusing medical
treatment, but also the right to a fair trial, which cannot be justified by any government interest.25

21. E.g., United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (requiring
“pre-medication resolution of the Sixth Amendment issue”); United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d
947, 960 (6th Cir. 1998) (requiring consideration of the potential effects on the defendant’s fair
trial rights before allowing involuntary medications).
22. E.g., Weston, 255 F.3d at 876 (deferring issue of trial rights until after medications are
administered); United States v. Arena, No. 00CR398(JFK), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17522, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2001) (ordering involuntary medications without any discussion of trial
rights); see also cases cited infra note 89 (allowing involuntary medications despite the absence
of a determination that the medications would not infringe upon the detainee’s trial rights).
23. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“The principle that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.”).
24. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (“The state has a legitimate interest
under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to
protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.”); Steele v.
Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ohio 2000) (“One state interest
that is sufficiently compelling to override an individual’s decision to refuse antipsychotic medication is the state’s interest in preventing mentally ill persons from harming themselves or others.”); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990) (holding that “the Due Process
Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is
in the inmate’s medical interest”).
25. See discussion infra Parts III, IV; cf. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[I]nvoluntary medication with antipsychotic drugs poses a
serious threat to a defendant’s right to a fair trial.”); Weston, 206 F.3d at 12 (per curiam) (“Involuntary antipsychotic medication has the potential to adversely affect the defendant’s ability to
obtain a fair trial as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment.” (citing United States v. Brandon,
158 F.3d 947, 954 (6th Cir. 1998) and United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 264-65 (4th Cir.
1999))); State v. Garcia, 658 A.2d 947, 973 (Conn. 1995) (“[A]lthough antipsychotic drugs can
have beneficent effects upon the mentally ill, their side effects also can compromise a criminal
defendant’s right to a fair trial.”); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychiatric Association for
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As background, Part II of this Note discusses recent cases relating to the administration of involuntary psychotropic medications to an incompetent pretrial detainee. Two cases examined in
detail are United States v. Weston, decided by the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals for the second time last July,26 and Riggins v. Nevada, the Supreme Court case that has come the closest to ruling on
the issue of administering involuntary psychotropic drugs to incompetent pretrial detainees.27 Part III discusses the ways that involuntary psychotropic drugs violate the right to a fair trial, including
diminishing the defendant’s ability to exercise procedural rights,
prejudicing the defendant’s demeanor, and altering evidence of the
defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense. Part IV considers counterarguments proposing that involuntary medications do
not necessarily violate the right to a fair trial. This part explains
why, despite such potentially curative measures as jury instructions and expert witnesses, the government cannot administer involuntary psychotropic medications to a defendant during trial
without undermining the fundamental fairness of the trial. Part V
proposes that the government should pursue civil commitment
rather than criminal prosecution of pretrial detainees whose competence to stand trial depends upon involuntary psychotropic medications. While criminal convictions usually promote such government
interests as retribution for past criminal activity and deterrence of
future criminal activity, these interests are not well served by convicting a defendant who has not received a fair trial. Because involuntary psychotropic medications pose a substantial threat to the
fundamental fairness of a criminal trial, prohibiting the government from administering these medications to a defendant during
trial, even if the defendant therefore cannot be brought to trial, results in the “loss” of interests that could not have been gained in
the first place.

Petitioner at 13, Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (No. 90-8466) (noting that involuntary
medication “may tilt the balance of the adversary system against the accused”).
26. 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 115 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also
Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99, 99 (D.D.C. 1999), rev’d, 206 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
27. 504 U.S. at 127.
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II. CURRENT CONFUSION ABOUT WHEN THE GOVERNMENT
MAY ADMINISTER INVOLUNTARY PSYCHOTROPIC
MEDICATIONS TO AN INCOMPETENT DETAINEE
A. One “Supreme” Source of Confusion: Riggins v. Nevada
In 1987, David Riggins was arrested for murder.28 While in
jail, Riggins complained of “hearing voices” and having difficulty
sleeping.29 A psychiatrist prescribed psychotropic medications to
treat these symptoms.30 Despite conflicting opinions from several
psychiatrists regarding Riggins’s competency, the trial court found
Riggins competent to stand trial.31 Riggins then asked the trial
court to allow him to stop taking the medications, arguing that continuing the medications would compromise his right to a fair trial
and interfere with his ability to present an insanity defense.32 After
conducting a hearing, at which several psychiatrists gave conflicting testimony about how discontinuing the medications would affect
Riggins’s competency to stand trial, the trial court denied Riggins’s
request.33 The trial court did not, however, explain that its decision
was based on the need to medicate Riggins to maintain his competency; in fact, the trial court did not explain its decision at all.34
A jury found Riggins guilty and sentenced him to death.35
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence,
rejecting Riggins’s claim that the continued administration of involuntary psychotropic medication had violated his right to a fair

28. Id. at 129.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 129-30. This point alone has generated confusion. A significant portion of the oral
argument before the Supreme Court was directed at clarifying whether Riggins needed to be
medicated to remain competent to stand trial. See U.S. Supreme Court Official Transcript,
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992), available at 1992 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 179, at *7-43. Lower
court cases decided since 1992 have almost universally looked to Riggins when considering
whether to allow the administration of involuntary medication to an incompetent pretrial detainee. See infra Part II.C (discussing recent cases). Riggins himself, however, was not found
incompetent to stand trial. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 130.
32. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 130 (“Relying on both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Nevada
Constitution, Riggins argued that continued administration of these drugs infringed his freedom
and that the drugs’ effect on his demeanor and mental state during trial would deny him due
process. Riggins also asserted that, because he would offer an insanity defense at trial, he had a
right to show jurors his ‘true mental state.’ ”).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 131.
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trial.36 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari “to decide
whether forced administration of antipsychotic medication during
trial violated rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.”37 Finding nothing in the trial court’s record to suggest any consideration of either the defendant’s interests in refusing medication or the government’s interests in continuing medication, the Court reversed and remanded the decision of the Nevada
Supreme Court,38 which vacated Riggins’s conviction and ordered a
new trial.39
The issue the U.S. Supreme Court actually decided in
Riggins was somewhat different than the one that it set out to decide. What the Court actually decided was not “whether” administration of involuntary medication during trial violated rights
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments,40 but rather
that such medication “may well have” violated these rights.41 Because the trial court had not attempted to justify its decision, the
only definitive conclusion to be drawn from the Supreme Court’s
reversal of this decision is that administering involuntary medications is certain to violate constitutional rights if not justified by any
government interest. On remand, the Nevada trial court avoided
the question, left unanswered by the U.S. Supreme Court, of what
government interests do justify administering involuntary medications, when Riggins decided to plead guilty.42 For courts that have
been confronted with detainees who without medications are not
competent to enter a plea,43 the Supreme Court’s decision in

36. Id. at 131-32; see also Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535, 539 (Nev. 1991) (affirming conviction and sentence).
37. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 132-33.
38. Id. at 138.
39. Riggins v. State, 860 P.2d 705, 705 (Nev. 1993).
40. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
41. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137 (“The court did not acknowledge the defendant’s liberty interest
in freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs. This error may well have impaired the constitutionally protected trial rights Riggins invokes.”); see also id. at 153 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137):
We took this case to decide “whether forced medication during trial violates a
defendant’s constitutional right to a full and fair trial.” Pet. for Cert. The Court
declines to answer this question one way or the other, stating only that a violation of Harper “may well have impaired the constitutionally protected trial
rights Riggins invokes.”
42. Nevada Briefs, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 22, 1996, at 5B, available at 1996 WL 2343631
(“Instead of going to trial again, Riggins agreed to plead guilty in April to first-degree murder
with a deadly weapon and robbery with a deadly weapon. The deal called for Riggins to receive a
life prison term, either with or without the possibility of parole.”).
43. A detainee must be competent to enter a plea. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,
448-49 (1992) (“The entry of a plea . . . presupposes that the defendant is competent to stand trial
and to enter a plea.”).
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Riggins has generated much confusion about when involuntary
medications may be administered.44
One source of confusion in Riggins is the Court’s reliance on
Washington v. Harper, a prison regulation case decided two years
earlier.45 This case, as the Riggins Court noted, held that although
Harper, a convicted prison inmate, did have a liberty interest in
refusing psychotropic medication, the compromise of that interest
was justified because Harper had been found to pose a danger to
himself or others in prison, and because the medication was in
Harper’s medical interest.46 The Riggins Court did not address,
though, the important difference between Harper and Riggins:
unlike Riggins, Harper had already been tried and convicted, and
thus, the potential of medication to affect the fairness of his trial
was not an issue.47 Although the Court did observe that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment affords at least as much protection to persons
the State detains for trial” as to convicted prisoners,48 it did not explicitly consider that pretrial detainees need not only the same level
of protection but different protections as well, protections that include the right to due process at trial. The Court’s failure to distinguish Riggins from Harper was compounded by its observation that
the State of Nevada “certainly would have satisfied due process” if
it had demonstrated that Riggins posed a danger to himself or others, that the protection of Riggins and others could not have been
achieved through a means less intrusive than medication, and that

44. See infra Parts II.B, C (discussing confusion among lower courts). Some courts have
noted explicitly the absence of guidance provided by the Riggins decision. See, e.g., Woodland v.
Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497, 1510 (D. Utah 1993) (observing that, regarding the question of what
interests of the state might justify involuntary medication, “[t]his is the total of the Riggins
Court’s guidance on this issue”); Harrison v. State, 635 So. 2d 894, 905 (Miss. 1994) (“[A]lthough
[Riggins] absolutely mandates that certain findings be made, it does not enlighten as to exactly
what those findings must be.”); Riggins v. Nevada, 860 P.2d 705, 707 (Nev. 1993) (Springer, J.,
dissenting) (“I . . . find in Riggins v. Nevada very little that will guide state courts as to the
proper constitutional procedures to be employed in cases involving the forced drugging of criminal defendants.”); cf. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The
Court’s opinion will require further proceedings on remand, but there seems to be little discussion about what is to be considered.”).
45. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133 (“Our discussion in Washington v. Harper provides useful
background for evaluating [Riggins’s] claim.” (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210
(1990))); Harper, 494 U.S. at 222 (“In Turner v. Safley, we considered various factors to determine the reasonableness of a challenged prison regulation. Three are relevant here.” (referring to
482 U.S. 78 (1987))).
46. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134-35 (citing Harper, 494 U.S. at 227).
47. Cf. Riggins, 860 P.2d at 708 n.3 (Springer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Supreme Court
for “treating accused Riggins not as a citizen accused of a crime but as a criminal in ‘penal confinement’ ”).
48. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)).
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the medication was in Riggins’s medical interest.49 Absent from this
list of factors necessary for satisfying due process, however, is a requirement that the government demonstrate that the medication
will not violate trial rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
The Court’s suggestion that virtually the same standard50
that was appropriate for determining whether to medicate a convicted inmate (Harper) was also appropriate for determining
whether to medicate a pretrial detainee (Riggins) seems to ignore
the potential of psychotropic medications to abridge the detainee’s
rights at trial. Yet, the Court did note the possibility that medication had compromised Riggins’s defense: “It is clearly possible
that . . . side effects had an impact upon not just Riggins’[s] outward appearance, but also the content of his testimony on direct or
cross examination, his ability to follow the proceedings, or the substance of his communication with counsel.”51 This statement, recognizing that psychotropic medications can interfere with the ability
to present a defense, is not easily reconciled with the statement
that due process “certainly” would have been satisfied by a standard that does not include any consideration of how these medications will affect a defendant’s rights at trial.
Also uncertain from the Court’s opinion is when, if ever, the
government’s interest in rendering a detainee competent to stand
trial can justify involuntary medications. The Court raised but did
not unambiguously resolve this issue, indicating only that “the
State might have been able to justify medically appropriate, involuntary treatment with the drug by establishing that it could not
obtain an adjudication of Riggins’[s] guilt or innocence by using less
intrusive means.”52 This statement has left lower courts wondering
whether “might” means that, in some cases, the government’s interest in rendering the detainee competent does justify involuntary
medications, or only that the Supreme Court was declining to decide this issue.53

49. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Harper, 494 U.S. at 225-26).
50. The Riggins Court did add a “least intrusive” component to the Harper test, 504 U.S. at
135, although whether medication is the least intrusive means of achieving the government’s
interest in preventing the detainee from harming himself or others is not relevant to the issue of
whether medication compromises the detainee’s right to receive a fair trial.
51. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137.
52. Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
53. See State v. Garcia, 658 A.2d 947, 962 (Conn. 1995):
It is unclear whether the Supreme Court, in using the word “might,” intended
to reserve the issue of whether the state can justify involuntary treatment to
restore a defendant to competency for the sole purpose of bringing him to trial,
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A concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy is more clear, both
in its acknowledgment of the differences between Harper and
Riggins54 and in its conclusion that a defendant rendered competent
by involuntary medications cannot be brought to trial if the medications will preclude him from receiving a fair trial.55 Some lower
courts, however, have ignored Justice Kennedy’s insights,56 while
others have either considered yet declined to follow them57 or suggested that they are no longer as relevant as when Riggins was decided.58

or whether the Court intended the word “might” to indicate that such treatment
is justified, but only if certain conditions are met.[;]
see also United States v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99, 111 (D.D.C. 1999) (“The Riggins Court . . .
stopped short of articulating either the circumstances under or standard by which the Court
could medicate a defendant solely to render him competent to stand trial.”).
54. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“This is not a case
like Washington v. Harper. . . .”). Interestingly, Justice Kennedy authored the Court’s opinion in
Harper. 494 U.S. at 213.
55. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 145 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If the defendant
cannot be tried without his behavior and demeanor being affected in this substantial way by
involuntary treatment, in my view the Constitution requires that society bear this cost in order
to preserve the integrity of the trial process.”).
56. E.g., State v. Kotis, 984 P.2d 78, 90-94 (Haw. 1999) (upholding decision to medicate an
incompetent pretrial detainee, without reference to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and without
consideration of the likely effect of psychotropic medications on the detainee’s trial rights). The
court concluded that the detainee’s dangerousness was sufficient to justify involuntary medication:
In sum, we read Riggins to require the following three findings before a criminal defendant may constitutionally be involuntarily medicated with antipsychotic drugs, where it is alleged that the medication is necessary because the
defendant poses a danger to himself or herself or others: (1) that the defendant
actually poses a danger of physical harm to himself or herself or others; (2) that
treatment with antipsychotic medication is medically appropriate, that is, in
the defendant’s medical interest; and (3) that, considering less intrusive alternatives, the treatment is essential to forestall the danger posed by the defendant.
Id. at 93.
57. E.g., State v. Baker, 511 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Neb. 1994) (“Although there may be situations where we might agree with Justice Kennedy . . . the present case is not such a situation.”
(referring to Riggins, 504 U.S. at 145)); State v. Adams, 888 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Wash. Ct. App.
1995) (“Adams urges this court to follow Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Riggins. . . . We
reject this invitation . . . .”).
58. E.g., United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 886 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Antipsychotic
drugs have progressed since Justice Kennedy discussed their side effects in Riggins.”); United
States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 134 (D.D.C. 2001) (suggesting that “[a]dvances in the
primary antipsychotic medications and adjunct therapies make such side effects [as discussed by
Justice Kennedy] less likely” (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 141-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring))). The
concerns raised in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence are not so easily resolved, however. See infra
notes 128-36 and accompanying text (discussing newer antipsychotic medications).
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B. Highlighting the Confusion: United States v. Weston
In a case that thus far has generated seven decisions and
twelve opinions, the federal courts in the District of Columbia have
recently considered the question of when the government may administer involuntary psychotropic medications to an incompetent
pretrial detainee.59 Russell Weston has been charged with premeditated murder, attempted murder, and the use of a firearm in the
commission of a violent crime.60 Because the district court found
him incompetent to stand trial,61 Weston was committed to a federal prison hospital, for the purpose of determining whether he
could be rendered competent.62 Whether Weston could be rendered
competent, however, depended upon whether he could be compelled
to take psychotropic medications.63
In its initial review, the D.C. District Court found that Weston posed a safety risk to himself and others, and authorized the
government to compel him to take psychotropic medications.64 Because the district court found that the government’s interest in preventing Weston from harming himself and others justified involuntary medications, the district court, citing Riggins, did not decide
whether the interest in rendering Weston competent to stand trial
would also justify involuntary medications.65 Additionally, the district court did not consider the merits of Weston’s argument that
administering psychotropic drugs would violate his right to a fair
trial; instead, the district court indicated that this issue was not
ripe because Weston was not competent to stand trial.66 The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals, in a per curiam opinion accompanied by
three separate concurrences, reversed, and remanded.67

59. See cases cited supra note 13.
60. United States v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99, 102 (D.D.C. 1999).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 103.
63. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
64. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 118 (“The Court has found that the proposed medication is
medically appropriate and that, considering less intrusive alternatives, it is essential for the
defendant’s own safety or the safety of others.”).
65. Id. at 111 (“[The] Riggins [case] indicates that if treatment is justified on dangerousness
grounds, as it is in the present case, the Court need not reach the issue whether the defendant
may be treated solely to render him competent to stand trial.”).
66. Id. at 117 (“[T]he Court does not find that the legal issues of whether the proposed
treatment will interfere with the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to counsel and to a fair
trial to be ripe at this juncture.” (citation omitted)).
67. See United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (Henderson,
Rogers & Tatel, JJ., each concurring separately).
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On remand, the district court reconsidered two issues:
whether sufficient evidence existed to support the finding that Weston was a danger to himself or others, and whether the government’s interest in rendering Weston competent to stand trial justified the possible infringement of Weston’s trial rights.68 The district
court again found that Weston posed a danger to others.69 The district court also found that administering involuntary medications
would not necessarily deny Weston a fair trial.70 While acknowledging that psychotropic medications could interfere with Weston’s
trial rights,71 the district court identified a variety of methods, such
as jury instructions and expert testimony, that might prevent any
prejudice caused by the medications from violating these rights.72
Additionally, the district court observed, citing Riggins, that “an
essential government interest can sometimes justify trial prejudice.”73

68. United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 116 (D.D.C. 2000); see also Weston, 206
F.3d at 13-15 (remanding to district court).
69. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 131 (“[T]he Court is persuaded that the government has presented additional factual evidence, as well as expert testimony, to support a conclusion that
Weston is a danger to those around him.”). In considering whether Weston also was a danger to
himself, the court found that although three years of untreated psychosis had caused Weston’s
condition to “progress[ ] to the point where Weston is preoccupied and dominated by his delusional system ‘to the exclusion of almost all aspects to existence beyond vegetative functions,’ “
(quoting report of psychiatrist), the court was “unaware of authority suggesting that this sort of
passive deterioration supports a finding of dangerousness to one’s self.” Id. at 127 n.17. “Passive
deterioration” might support a finding that Weston has become “gravely disabled,” and therefore,
is a danger to himself. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 215 n.3 (1990) (noting that one
definition of “gravely disabled” is that “a person, as a result of a mental disorder . . . manifests
severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive
or volitional control over his or her actions and is not receiving such care as is essential for his or
her health or safety” (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(1) (1987))). Although Weston, in
seclusion for the past three years, might be receiving the care essential for his physical safety, he
is certainly not receiving the care essential for his mental health. See Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at
130 (“Seclusion is simply the warehousing of Weston in a psychotic state.”); see also Anne Hull, A
Living Hell or a Life Saved?, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2001, at A1 (“Because Weston has received no
treatment and could be dangerous, he has been kept in seclusion for more than two years, an
unheard-of period of isolation in modern times.”).
70. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 137 (“There is no reason to conclude, at this time, that involuntary medication would preclude Weston from receiving a fair trial.”).
71. Id. at 132-33 (“Involuntary antipsychotic medication has the potential to adversely affect Weston’s ability to obtain a fair trial. . . . Accordingly, before allowing the government to
medicate Weston, the Court must consider the potential impact of medication on his fair trial
rights.” (citation omitted)).
72. Id. at 137; see also infra note 191 (discussing these measures). The inadequacy of such
measures is discussed infra Part IV.
73. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 134 (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992)). Not
even an essential government interest, however, can justify the conviction of a defendant at a
trial that lacks a basic, fundamental level of fairness. See infra notes 254-58 and accompanying
text.
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Again, Weston appealed the district court’s ruling allowing
the government to compel him to take psychotropic drugs. The second panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to consider this case
affirmed the district court’s decision to allow involuntary medications.74 The court of appeals based its decision, however, solely on
the government’s interest in rendering Weston competent to stand
trial,75 and not also (as the district court had) on the interest in
preventing Weston from harming others.76 Further, the court of appeals did not decide whether the government’s interests justified
the possible compromise of Weston’s right to a fair trial. Instead,
the court of appeals essentially repeated what the district court had
first held more than two years earlier, that the question of whether
government interests can justify administering involuntary medications to Weston during trial could be deferred until after Weston
has been medicated.77
Thus, after three years of motions, hearings, opinions, and
appeals,78 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has finally decided79
that government interests presently justify administering involuntary psychotropic medications to render Weston competent to stand
trial,80 but may or may not justify continuing the medications once
Weston’s response to them is observed.81 Undoubtedly, certain as-

74. See United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
75. See id. (affirming “the district court’s conclusion that the government’s interest in administering antipsychotic drugs to make Weston competent for trial overrides his liberty interest”).
76. The court suggested that the first appellate decision might preclude a finding that involuntary medication is justified by the government’s interest in diminishing Weston’s dangerousness:
Absent a showing that Weston’s condition now exceeds the institution’s ability
to contain it through his present state of confinement, the prior decision appears to preclude a finding of dangerousness. . . . We need not determine
whether our concurring colleague’s different interpretation of the previous
panel’s decision is correct in view of our affirmance of the district court’s competency-for-trial ground of decision.
Id. at 879 (citing concurring opinion of Rogers, J.) (additional citation omitted).
77. See id. at 886 n.8 (“Whether antipsychotic medication will impair Weston’s right to a
fair trial is best determined when the actual effects of the medication are known, that is, after he
is medicated.”); United States v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99, 107 (D.D.C. 1999) (“In the event that
medication successfully renders the defendant competent to stand trial, the Court could then
reach the defendant’s argument that the Due Process Clause or the Sixth Amendment will require a heightened showing before the defendant may be forcibly medicated during the trial.”).
78. See cases cited supra note 13.
79. A small possibility exists that this decision is not final, as Weston’s attorneys have filed
a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. See United States v.
Weston, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001), petition for cert. filed, Sept. 5, 2001 (No. 01-6161).
80. Weston, 255 F.3d at 876.
81. See id. at 883 (noting “agree[ment] with the district court that ‘there is no reason to conclude, at this time, that involuntary medication would preclude Weston from receiving a fair
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pects of this case are somewhat unusual, such as the intense attention of the national media.82 Nonetheless, United States v. Weston
reflects the general state of confusion that presently exists about
when the government may compel an incompetent pretrial detainee
to take psychotropic medications.83
C. The Scope of the Confusion: A Survey of Recent Cases
Recent cases in which a court has been asked to decide
whether the government may compel an incompetent pretrial detainee to take psychotropic medications reveal two major points of
disagreement. First, courts disagree about whether a finding that
medications are necessary to prevent a detainee from harming himself or others can justify involuntary medications without considering the impact of the medications on the detainee’s trial rights.84
Additionally, courts disagree about whether the government’s interest in rendering a detainee competent to stand trial can justify
administering involuntary medications when such medications are
not also necessary to decrease the detainee’s dangerousness.85
When the government seeks to administer involuntary psychotropic drugs to an incompetent detainee, usually the first (and
sometimes the only) issue that a court considers is whether the detainee poses a danger to himself or others.86 If the detainee is dan-

trial’ ” (quoting United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 137 (D.D.C. 2001)) (emphasis
added)).
82. See, e.g., From the Shootings to the Investigation, WASH. POST, at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/shooting/archives2.htm (linking stories about the Russell Weston case); Nightline: Insanity in the Courtroom: When Getting Well
May Be a Death Sentence (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 23, 2001); 20/20: Capitol Gunman
(ABC television broadcast, Sept. 15, 1999).
83. See discussion infra Part II.C.
84. Compare cases cited infra note 89 (allowing involuntary medications based only on a
finding of dangerousness), with United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per
curiam) (requiring consideration of both dangerousness and trial rights).
85. Compare Khiem v. United States, 612 A.2d 160, 165-66 (D.C. 1992) (as amended on rehearing) (finding government’s interest did justify administering involuntary medications to a
nondangerous detainee), and Weston, 255 F.3d at 876 (same), with Woodland v. Angus, 820 F.
Supp. 1497, 1519 (D. Utah 1993) (finding government’s interest did not justify administering
involuntary medications to a nondangerous detainee), and United States v. Santonio, No. 2100CR-90C, 2001 WL 760932, at *6 (D. Utah May 3, 2001) (same).
86. “Danger” is used in this Note to mean that the detainee is a danger to himself or others
because of a mental illness. Generally, these two criteria will justify involuntary treatment of
any person, regardless of whether he has been charged with a crime or found incompetent to
stand trial. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (noting that “the initial inquiry in a
civil commitment proceeding is . . . [w]hether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to
either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy . . . .”).
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gerous, the government can attempt to justify involuntary medications on the basis of its interest in preventing the detainee from
harming himself or others.87 In most cases in which a court has
reviewed the government’s decision to administer involuntary
medications to an incompetent detainee, the court has found that the
detainee poses a danger to himself or others.88 Many of these courts
have held that a finding of dangerousness is sufficient to justify
compelling an incompetent detainee to take psychotropic drugs.89
The consequence for the detainee is that he can be compelled to
take psychotropic medications on the basis of his dangerousness;
then, if the medications render him competent, he can be brought to
trial without any consideration of whether government interests
justify compromising not only his interest in refusing unwanted
treatment, but also his right to a fair trial.90

87. See supra note 24 (discussing the government’s parens patriae and police powers).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 262 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that the
detainee is a danger to self or others); United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 131 (D.D.C.
2001) (same); United States v. Keeven, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1140 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (same); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 176-77 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999), cert. granted, 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 4959
(Colo. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 2001 Colo. LEXIS 778 (Colo. Sept. 17, 2001) (en banc) (same);
State v. Kotis, 984 P.2d 78, 92-93 (Haw. 1999) (same); State v. Baker, 511 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Neb.
1994) (same).
89. See, e.g., Morgan, 193 F.3d at 262 (concluding that “Morgan’s due process rights were
adequately protected below, in light of the administrative finding that treatment with antipsychotic medication is necessary because Morgan is dangerous to himself and others.”); Keeven, 115
F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (recommending that “involuntary medication be re-instituted if it is still the
professional judgment of the medical staff that it is necessary to control [defendant’s] dangerousness”); Tally, 7 P.3d at 176-77 (noting that “administration of the drug was specifically found
to be required to prevent defendant from seriously harming himself or others and to prevent a
further deterioration in his mental condition”); Kotis, 984 P.2d at 92-93 (“Riggins suggested that,
although a criminal defendant, like any other mental health patient, possesses a fundamental
right to refuse treatment threatening his bodily integrity, that right may be overridden by the
state’s interest in preventing him or her from causing physical harm to self or others.”); Baker,
511 N.W.2d at 762 (affirming involuntary medication of an incompetent pretrial detainee because “the evidence demonstrated that appellant was mentally ill and dangerous and that the
treatment was necessary for the protection of himself as well as others”); cf. Woodland, 820 F.
Supp. at 1514 n.20 (“A finding that plaintiff presents a danger to himself or others would justify
the forcible administration of the drugs.” (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227
(1990))).
90. The question of whether an incompetent pretrial detainee may be compelled to take psychotropic drugs on the basis of dangerousness to self or others when the drugs “might have the
incidental effect of rendering him competent to stand trial,” Morgan, 193 F.3d at 264, is similar
in some respects to the question of whether a prisoner sentenced to death can be compelled to
take psychotropic drugs on the basis of dangerousness when an incidental effect of the drugs
might be that the prisoner becomes competent to be executed. The Supreme Court has held that
the government cannot execute an incompetent prisoner. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410
(1986). At least one state supreme court has held that the government cannot administer
involuntary medications for the sole purpose of rendering a prisoner competent to be executed.
State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 771 (La. 1992). When the government argues that involuntary
psychotropic medications are needed to prevent the prisoner from harming himself or others,
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The government also may seek to administer involuntary
medications to an incompetent pretrial detainee who is not a danger to himself or others.91 If a detainee is not dangerous, involuntary medications cannot be justified by the government’s interest in
protecting the health and safety of the detainee or others. Instead,
the government must justify involuntary medications solely on the
basis of its interest in rendering the detainee competent to stand
trial.92 Some courts, applying a strict scrutiny standard of review,93

ers, rather than solely to render the prisoner competent to be executed, determining whether to
allow the medications is more complicated. The Eighth Circuit recently decided that it simply
could not decide whether the government could administer involuntary medications for the purpose of diminishing dangerousness when the medications might also result in competency to be
executed, and granted a permanent stay of execution. Singleton v. Norris, 267 F.3d 859, 871 (8th
Cir. 2001). For further discussion of the various issues related to competency to be executed, see
Roberta M. Harding, “Endgame”: Competency and the Execution of Condemned Inmates—A Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition Against the Infliction of Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 105 (1994); Paul J. Larkin, The Eighth Amendment
and the Execution of the Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1980); John L. Farringer
IV, Note, The Competency Conundrum: Problems Courts Have Faced in Applying Different Standards for Competency to be Executed, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2441 (2001); Rochelle Graff Salguero,
Note, Medical Ethics and Competency to Be Executed, 96 YALE L.J. 167 (1986).
91. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 94-97.
92. Department of Justice regulations suggest that the government may medicate a detainee for the sole purpose of rendering him competent to stand trial. The Bureau of Prisons
regulations on Medical Services provide that a detainee may be medicated following an administrative hearing at which “[t]he psychiatrist conducting the hearing shall determine whether
treatment or psychotropic medication is necessary in order to attempt to make the inmate competent for trial or is necessary because the inmate is dangerous to self or others, is gravely disabled, or is unable to function in the open population of a mental health referral center or a regular prison.” Administrative Safeguards for Psychiatric Treatment and Medication, 28 C.F.R. §
549.43(a)(5) (1995). Although this regulation seems to allow administration of involuntary psychotropic medication based solely on a finding that medication is “necessary in order to attempt
to make the inmate competent for trial,” some courts consider this question unsettled. See, e.g.,
United States v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99, 119 (D.D.C. 1999) (“[C]ase law does not clearly indicate whether the government can forcibly medicate a defendant solely to render him competent
to stand trial.”). Interestingly, this is exactly what the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals recently
decided that the government could do. See United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (affirming district court’s decision allowing involuntary medication, based solely on the
government’s interest in rendering the detainee competent to stand trial).
93. Government actions that compromise “nonfundamental” interests are subject to “rational basis” review. This standard requires a government action to be reasonably related to
serving a legitimate government interest. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491
(1955) (“We cannot say that the regulation has no rational relation to th[e] [State’s] objective and
therefore is beyond constitutional bounds.”). Government actions that compromise “fundamental” interests are reviewed under a “strict scrutiny” standard, which requires that the action be
narrowly tailored to serving a compelling government interest. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 920 (1995) (“To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State must demonstrate that its . . . legislation is
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.” (citation omitted)); see also Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“This enactment involves what, by common
understanding throughout the English-speaking world, must be granted to be a most fundamental aspect of ‘liberty,’ . . . and it is this which requires that the statute be subjected to ‘strict scru-
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have decided that the government’s interest in rendering a nondangerous detainee competent to stand trial does not justify administering involuntary medications.94 Other courts, applying an intermediate or “heightened” standard, have reached inconsistent decisions:95 some have allowed involuntary medications96 while some
have not.97 In Riggins, the Supreme Court expressly declined to articulate a standard of review for administering involuntary medications to a defendant before or during trial; thus, it remains unclear
what the Court would consider to be the appropriate standard of
review.98

tiny.’ ” (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942))). Courts have also applied an
“intermediate” standard of review, which requires government actions to be “substantially related” to “important government objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.”).
94. E.g., United States v. Santonio, No. 2100-CR-90C, 2001 WL 760932, at *4 (D. Utah May
3, 2001) (indicating that “the court will apply the standard of strict scrutiny to the determination
of whether Mr. Santonio may be forcibly medicated” and finding involuntary medications not
justified); cf. United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 957 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that “the government’s request to forcibly medicate Brandon must be reviewed under the strict-scrutiny standard” and remanding to the district court for further proceedings (citing Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d
1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1984))).
95. These inconsistent decisions reflect, at least to some extent, inconsistent ideas about
how to define those government interests that are sufficiently important to justify involuntary
medications. For example, one court found that rendering a detainee, who was charged with
second-degree murder, competent to stand trial was not a sufficiently important government
interest, Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497, 1519 n.28 (D. Utah 1993), while another court
found that rendering a detainee, who was charged with conspiracy to import cocaine, competent
to stand trial was a sufficiently important government interest, United States v. Arena, No.
00CR398(JFK), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17522, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2001) (“Over half a ton of
cocaine is important business and, if the drug laws mean anything, the Government should have
an opportunity to bring Mr. Arena to trial.”). The problem with a rule that varies the government’s ability to administer involuntary medications according to the severity of the offense with
which the detainee is charged is that not only does the severity of the charged offense correlate
with the magnitude of the government’s interest in rendering the detainee competent, it also
correlates with the magnitude of the detainee’s interest in receiving a fair trial.
96. E.g., Weston, 255 F.3d at 880 (applying a “form of heightened scrutiny” and finding involuntary medications justified); Arena, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17522, at *7 (asserting that “[t]he
Weston court enunciated the applicable standard: ‘to medicate [a defendant], the government
must prove that restoring his competence to stand trial is necessary to accomplish an essential
state policy,’ “ and allowing involuntary medications (quoting Weston, 255 F.3d at 880)).
97. E.g., Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp. at 1519 n.28 (requiring a “compelling or other
significant interest” and finding involuntary medications not justified).
98. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 136 (1992) (“We have no occasion to finally prescribe
. . . substantive standards . . . .”). The language used by the majority to describe the nature of
both the defendant’s and the government’s interests is so suggestive of strict scrutiny, however,
that the dissent insisted that the majority, despite its denial, was indeed adopting such a standard. Id. at 156 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority replied, “Contrary to the dissent’s understanding, we do not ‘adopt a standard of strict scrutiny.’ ” Id. at 136; see also Brandon, 158 F.3d
at 957 (“On the one hand, the Court [in Riggins] seems to have alluded to a strict-scrutiny ap-
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A more basic problem, however, than courts’ uncertainty
about the appropriate standard of review, is courts’ failure to consider as two distinct government actions the administration of involuntary psychotropic medications to a detainee who has been convicted of a crime, or who has not been charged with a crime, and the
administration of involuntary psychotropic medications to a defendant who is on trial. Generally, involuntary medications infringe a
detainee’s interest in refusing medical treatment, which the government’s interests in preventing harm to the detainee and others
can justify.99 During a trial, however, involuntary medications infringe the detainee’s right to a fair trial, which government interests cannot justify.100
III. WHY GOVERNMENT INTERESTS CANNOT JUSTIFY
ADMINISTERING INVOLUNTARY PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATIONS
TO A DEFENDANT DURING TRIAL
A. Background: Effects and Side Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs
In his concurring opinion in Riggins v. Nevada, Justice Kennedy observed that administering involuntary antipsychotic medications101 can violate a defendant’s right to a fair trial in two ways:

proach. . . . On the other hand, the Court’s majority opinion makes it clear that it did not set out
any standard . . . .”).
99. See supra note 24 (discussing the government’s parens patriae and police powers). Although the government’s interest in preventing harm may justify administering involuntary
medications to an incompetent detainee prior to trial, actually administering the medications
might require civil commitment proceedings. Under Jackson v. Indiana, the government may
hold a detainee because he is incompetent to stand trial only until the court determines whether
the detainee can be rendered competent, or while treatment is being administered to render the
detainee competent. 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). If treatment is being administered not to render a
detainee competent but to diminish his dangerousness, Jackson may preclude the government
from continuing to hold the detainee without a civil commitment order. See id.
100. See discussion infra Parts III, IV.
101. This part focuses on antipsychotic medications, which are commonly used to treat psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia. See supra note 10. This is because pretrial detainees who
(1) are incompetent to stand trial, and (2) might be rendered competent by psychotropic drugs,
are usually suffering from schizophrenia. See, e.g., United States v. Keeven, 115 F. Supp. 2d
1132, 1133 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (noting diagnosis of schizophrenia); United States v. Weston, 69 F.
Supp. 2d 99, 107 (D.D.C. 1999) (same); People v. Jones, 931 P.2d 960, 979 (Cal. 1997) (same);
State v. Baker, 511 N.W.2d 757, 761 (Neb. 1994) (same). While an in-depth discussion of other
kinds of psychotropic drugs is beyond the scope of this Note, to the extent that other drugs produce effects and side effects that are similar to those produced by antipsychotic drugs, this discussion is relevant to cases in which the government seeks to compel a detainee to take antidepressant drugs, for example, or antiseizure drugs. See, e.g., Benson v. Terhune, 157 F. Supp. 2d
1093, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“The drugs taken by petitioner including Valium, Vistaril, and
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by altering his demeanor and by interfering with his ability to assist his attorney in presenting a defense.102 These violations result
from the side effects commonly produced by phenothiazines, the
kind of antipsychotic medication administered to Riggins,103 and
still the most widely prescribed class of antipsychotic medication.104
Antipsychotic medications were discovered, somewhat by accident,
in the 1950s, when a physician observed that administering phenothiazines prior to surgery reduced the amount of anesthesia required during surgery, because the drugs produced “calmness, conscious sedation, and disinterest in and detachment from external
stimuli.”105 The intended therapeutic effect when prescribed for
schizophrenia is the alleviation of some of the most disturbing
symptoms of this disorder, including delusions and hallucinations.106 Psychologists have used the term “positive symptoms” to

Elavil alter the chemical processes in the mind and may have potential side effects similar to
those induced by Mellaril and other anti-psychotic drugs (e.g. sedation, drowsiness, agitation,
aggression, inappropriate behavior, and anxiety).”). For a review of the effects and side effects of
different kinds of psychotropic drugs, see generally ROBERT M. JULIEN, M.D., PH.D., A PRIMER
OF DRUG ACTION (9th ed. 2001).
102. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The drugs can
prejudice the accused in two principal ways: (1) by altering his demeanor in a manner that will
prejudice his reactions and presentation in the courtroom, and (2) by rendering him unable or
unwilling to assist counsel.”). The dissent agreed that administration of psychotropic drugs could
deprive a defendant of a fair trial, but argued that the evidence did not support a finding that
the drugs administered to Riggins had actually deprived him of a fair trial. Id. at 154 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
103. See id. at 141-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). The side effects produced by
these drugs are discussed in detail infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text. Also, the possibility exists that Riggins was overmedicated: “If you are dealing with someone very sick then you
may prescribe up to 800 milligrams which is the dose he had been taking which is very, very
high. I mean you can tranquilize an elephant with 800 milligrams.” Riggins, 504 U.S. at 143
(quoting testimony of psychiatrist). Determining an appropriate therapeutic dose of an antipsychotic medication is often a difficult task. See JULIEN, supra note 101, at 341 (indicating that
“most dosage decisions are made on a trial-and-error basis” because “the plasma concentrations
vary widely among patients given similar amounts of orally-administered neuroleptics”).
104. JULIEN, supra note 101, at 339 (“The phenothiazines are the most widely used and least
expensive drugs for treating psychosis.”).
105. Id. at 336.
106. Id. at 336-37. The Greek roots of the term “schizophrenia” mean “split mind,” expressing
the fracturing of psychological functions that are normally integrated, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and behaviors. See supra note 6 (describing the symptoms of schizophrenia).
Two of the defining symptoms of schizophrenia are delusions and hallucinations. Delusions are
“erroneous beliefs that usually involve a misinterpretation of perceptions or experiences.” DSMIV-TR, supra note 15, at 299. Common delusions include delusions of persecution (a person believes that “he or she is being tormented, followed, tricked, spied on, or ridiculed”) and delusions
of reference (a person believes that “certain gestures, comments, passages from books, newspapers, song lyrics, or other environmental cues are specifically directed at him or her”). Id. Hallucinations are “sensory experiences in the absence of any stimulation from the environment.”
DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 10, at 285. Among people with schizophrenia, auditory hallucina-
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describe experiences, such as delusions and hallucinations, that
“reflect an excess or distortion of normal functions.”107 Researchers
believe that abnormal activity in a particular kind of brain cell
(neurons activated by the neurotransmitter dopamine) in a particular area of the brain (the limbic system) is at least partly responsible for producing many of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia.108 All medications that are used to treat schizophrenia have the
effect of reducing dopamine activity.109
Although a diagnosis of schizophrenia depends upon the
presence of positive symptoms,110 the disorder also involves another
category of symptoms, called “negative symptoms.”111 Negative
symptoms reflect a “diminution or loss of normal functions.”112
Common negative symptoms include restrictions in emotional responsiveness, verbal behavior, social interaction, and motor activity.113 For most patients, phenothiazines are moderately effective in
alleviating the positive symptoms of schizophrenia,114 but do not
improve115 and may even intensify the negative symptoms.116 Additionally, these drugs produce substantial side effects;117 traditional
antipsychotic medications are also called neuroleptics, “because

tions are the most common, and some types of hallucinations, such as hearing a voice speaking
one’s thoughts, are particularly diagnostic of schizophrenia. See id. at 286.
107. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 15, at 299; see also Billiot v. State, 655 So. 2d 1, 5 (Miss. 1995)
(noting that “catatonic excitement, delusions, [and] hallucinations” are “positive symptoms of
schizophrenia”); JULIEN, supra note 101, at 331 (“The positive symptoms are those typical of
psychosis and include delusions and hallucinations, bizarre behaviors, dissociated or fragmented
thoughts, incoherence, and illogicality.”).
108. JULIEN, supra note 101, at 341.
109. Id. at 356.
110. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 15, at 312 (listing diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia).
111. Id. at 299.
112. Id.
113. See id.; see also State v. Perry, 13 S.W.3d 724, 731 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (noting that
“the defendant presents primarily negative symptoms” including “flat affect, an inability to engage in goal directed behavior, [and] a poverty of speech”).
114. See JULIEN, supra note 101, at 379-80 (indicating that ten to twenty percent of patients
do not respond to traditional antipsychotics (quoting S.R. Marder et al., Schizophrenia, 16
PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 567-88 (1993)).
115. Id. at 332 (noting that “the classic [antipsychotic] agents affect primarily the positive
symptoms”).
116. Id. (noting that the traditional antipsychotics “may worsen the negative symptomatolgy
of schizophrenia”); Gary D. Tollefson & Todd M. Sanger, Negative Symptoms: A Path Analytic
Approach to a Double-Blind, Placebo- and Haloperidol-Controlled Clinical Trial with Olanzapine, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 466, 472 (1997) (noting that “neuroleptic drugs may actually worsen
negative symptoms”).
117. See JULIEN, supra note 101, at 343 (“The therapeutic use of the phenothiazines invariably leads to many side effects.”).
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they produce side effects similar to the symptoms of a neurological
disease.”118
Perhaps the side effect most objectionable to patients taking
these drugs is a syndrome called akathisia, which is characterized
by a “subjective feeling of anxiety, accompanied by restlessness,
pacing, constant rocking back and forth, and other repetitive, purposeless actions.”119 Other common motor disturbances include
“tremors of the fingers, a shuffling gate, and drooling.”120 Antipsychotics also, as was observed when they were first given to preoperative patients, produce such cognitive and emotional side effects
as diminished consciousness and impaired motivation.121 Some evidence suggests that these drugs also cause memory deficits.122 Different antipsychotics have different side effect profiles; for example,
some tend to cause high levels of sedation but low levels of involuntary motor movements, while others cause low levels of sedation but
high levels of involuntary motor movements.123 People taking these
medications to treat the symptoms of schizophrenia often take additional medications to treat the side effects of the antipsychotics.124
While helpful in preventing the side effects from becoming so both-

118. DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 10, at 305. Although they can be severe, most side effects
are temporary, enduring only so long as the drugs are administered. See JULIEN, supra note 101,
at 342. One side effect, though, is usually permanent, persisting even after the drugs are discontinued. Id. Tardive dyskinesia, which develops in ten to twenty percent of patients taking phenothiazines and other traditional antipsychotics, is characterized by “involuntary hyperkinetic
movements, often of the face and tongue but also of the trunk and limbs, which can be severely
disabling.” Id. Another side effect, less common but potentially fatal, is neuroleptic malignant
syndrome, which can involve respiratory or cardiac failure. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 15, at
796.
119. JULIEN, supra note 101, at 342; see also Simon M. Halstead, Thomas R.E. Barnes & Jeremy Speller, Akathisia: Prevalence and Associated Dysphoria in an In-patient Population with
Chronic Schizophrenia, 164 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 177, 177 (1994) (“Akathisia can be particularly
distressing and difficult to tolerate.”).
120. DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 10, at 305. The American Psychological Association has
identified six “Medication-Induced Movement Disorders” associated with the use of neuroleptics:
“Neuroleptic-Induced Parkinsonism, Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome, Neuroleptic-Induced
Acute Dystonia, Neuroleptic-Induced Acute Akathisia, Neuroleptic-Induced Tardive Dyskinesia,
and Medication-Induced Postural Tremor.” DSM-IV-TR, supra note 15, at 791.
121. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
122. See Stacy A. Castner, Graham V. Williams & Patricia S. Goldman-Rakic, Reversal of
Antipsychotic-Induced Working Memory Deficits by Short-Term Dopamine D1 Receptor Stimulation, SCIENCE, Mar. 2000, at 2021 (indicating that “the present findings provide evidence that
chronic haloperidol treatment can induce cognitive deficits”).
123. JULIEN, supra note 101, at 340 (comparing side effects of different antipsychotic drugs).
124. See id. at 343; see also United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 137 (D.D.C. 2001)
(indicating that one way to “manage the side effects of antipsychotic medications” is “through
supplementary medications”).
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ersome that patients refuse to continue taking the antipsychotics,125
these ancillary medications cause side effects of their own.126
From a treatment perspective, the ideal antipsychotic drug
would alter the neurotransmitter activity only of the particular
brain cells that are functioning abnormally and are thereby causing
symptoms of schizophrenia. Although drugs that alleviate the
symptoms of schizophrenia without producing any side effects do
not yet and perhaps may never exist, researchers are developing
drugs that seem to be better than the phenothiazines and other
traditional antipsychotics at targeting the specific neurons responsible for producing the symptoms of schizophrenia. Since the
Riggins decision in 1992, pharmaceutical companies have introduced several new “atypical” antipsychotic drugs, which produce
different neurotransmitter effects than the traditional antipsychotics.127 While these newer drugs reduce dopamine activity, they do so
more selectively than the phenothiazines, and they also reduce the
activity of other neurotransmitters, especially serotonin.128 Perhaps
because of this different effect on serotonin, atypical antipsychotics
are more effective than traditional antipsychotics in alleviating
negative symptoms of schizophrenia.129 Some patients have even
described their response to these newer drugs as a “wakening.”130
Because they reduce dopamine activity more selectively than
do the phenothiazines, atypical antipsychotics are less likely to
produce extrapyramidal side effects,131 at least when taken in mod-

125. Cf. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 15, at 791 (noting that movement disorders induced by antipsychotic medications “can lead to non-compliance with treatment”); Bruce J. Winick, The
Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1, 70 (1989) (“Although these side effects are unintended, they are intrinsic to the drugs’ benevolent properties and should not be trivialized, particularly since patients frequently experience
them to be distressing enough to outweigh the drugs’ positive clinical effects.”).
126. See Stephen R. Marder, M.D., Schizophrenia: Somatic Treatment, in KAPLAN &
SADOCK’S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1199, 1205 (Benjamin J. Sadock & Virginia
A. Sadock eds., 7th ed. 2000) (noting that medications used to manage the extrapyramidal side
effects of antipsychotics “cause their own adverse effects including dry mouth, constipation,
blurred vision, and often memory loss”).
127. See JULIEN, supra note 101, at 335-36; see also United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873,
877 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The atypicals, which the government has not ruled out, are newer and
‘have a more favorable side effect profile.’ ” (quoting Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 124)).
128. JULIEN, supra note 101, at 347 (describing the pharmacodynamics of clozapine).
129. See Stephen M. Stahl, Selecting an Atypical Antipsychotic by Combining Clinical Experience with Guidelines from Clinical Trials, 60 (suppl. 10) J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 31, 31
(1999) (noting as one property of atypical antipsychotics that they have “better efficacy for negative symptoms”).
130. JULIEN, supra note 101, at 348.
131. Id. at 335 (indicating that atypicals have a “reduce[d] . . . incidence of abnormal movement-generating side effects”).
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erate doses.132 Atypical antipsychotics are, however, likely to cause
other substantial side effects. Because each drug produces a different array of neurotransmitter effects, the side effects of atypical
antipsychotics vary greatly.133 Some atypicals, for example, cause
extreme sedation,134 while others are more likely to cause agitation
and anxiety.135 Additionally, atypical antipsychotics are difficult to
administer without a patient’s cooperation, because unlike the traditional antipsychotics, atypicals are not available in forms that can
be injected.136
B. How Administering Involuntary Psychotropic Drugs During Trial
Violates the Defendant’s Fair Trial Rights
1. Interference with the Exercise of Procedural Rights
The purpose of a criminal trial is the fair determination of
the guilt or innocence of a person accused of a crime.137 The importance of fairness is reflected in the provisions of the Constitution
intended to ensure that someone charged with a crime is not con-

132. See id. at 352; see also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 15, at 791-92 (“While newer antipsychotic medications are less likely to cause Medication-Induced Movement Disorders, these syndromes still occur.”).
133. JULIEN, supra note 101, at 356; see also Christopher S. Thomas & Shon Lewis, Which
Atypical Antipsychotic?, 172 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 106, 106 (1998) (“The atypical antipsychotics
cause fewer extrapyramidal side-effects than older drugs, but the pattern with which they block
other brain receptors varies considerably between drugs, which is reflected in different sideeffect profiles.”).
134. See JULIEN, supra note 101, at 349-50 (describing side effects of clozapine).
135. See id. at 352 (describing side effects of risperidone). Although permanent side effects
such as tardive dyskinesia are unlikely, several atypical antipsychotics do pose a risk of lifethreatening side effects, including neuroleptic malignant syndrome. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note
15, at 791-92 (noting that newer antipsychotics can cause the same motor disorders as the traditional antipsychotics). Other potentially fatal side effects include agranulocytosis (a blood disorder) and cardiac irregularities. JULIEN, supra note 101, at 347, 350. Furthermore, because atypical antipsychotics have been widely available for only slightly more than ten years, any consequences of long-term administration remain to be discovered. See id. at 335 (indicating that the
first atypical antipsychotic was made widely available in the early 1990s).
136. See Joseph P. McEvoy, Patricia L. Scheifler & Allen Frances (eds.), The Expert Consensus Guidelines Series: Treatment of Schizophrenia 1999, 60 (suppl. 11) J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
8, 12 (1999) (noting that traditional antipsychotics are indicated for patients who require “IM
[intramuscular] medication,” which is “not yet available for the atypicals”).
137. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986) (“Without these basic [constitutional]
protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of
guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” (citation omitted)).
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victed without an adequate opportunity to defend himself.138 The
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the federal and state
governments, respectively, from depriving a person “of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.”139 The Fifth Amendment
further prohibits the government from compelling a defendant to
testify against himself.140 The Sixth Amendment grants several
specific procedural rights, including the right to be tried by an impartial jury, to confront witnesses for the prosecution and also to
summon witnesses for the defense, and to receive the assistance of
counsel.141 Supreme Court decisions have added several other particular rights to the operational definition of a fair trial, including
the right to be present during the trial,142 to have counsel appointed

138. Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (“The fact that this right [to confront witnesses] appears in the Sixth Amendment of our Bill of Rights reflects the belief of the Framers of
those liberties and safeguards that confrontation was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial
in a criminal prosecution.”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (describing “the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment” as “deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of
life and liberty”).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment has been applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3
(1964).
141. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Many of the protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment have been
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406
(applying right to confront prosecution witnesses); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340
(1963) (applying right to receive assistance of counsel).
142. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934) (holding that “in a prosecution
for a felony the defendant has the privilege under the Fourteenth Amendment to be present in
his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of
his opportunity to defend against the charge”). This presence refers to more than being physically present. Cf. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“The mentally incompetent defendant, though physically in the courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend himself.”).
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if necessary,143 to receive assistance of counsel that is effective,144 to
present witnesses145 and other forms of evidence,146 and to testify.147
Psychotropic drugs can interfere with a defendant’s ability to
exercise these rights by causing sedation, producing feelings of restlessness and anxiety, diminishing awareness of and interest in
events happening in the surrounding environment, disrupting
memory, and inducing all manner of motor disturbances.148 Administering involuntary psychotropic medications is likely to impair
many abilities necessary for presenting a defense, including the
ability to pay attention to what witnesses, or the attorneys, or anyone else in the courtroom is saying; to offer comments or suggestions or otherwise engage in a dialogue about the trial; to understand and respond to questions while testifying; and even to decide
whether to testify.149 By administering involuntary antipsychotic
medications, the government interferes with the defendant’s general right to be present, as well as with his more specific rights to
receive effective assistance of counsel, to confront witnesses, to present evidence, and to testify on his own behalf.150

143. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 72 (1932) (holding that “the right to have counsel
appointed, when necessary, is a logical corollary from the constitutional right to be heard by
counsel”).
144. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (noting that “the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel” (citations omitted)); cf. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (defining the standard for effective assistance of counsel).
145. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1976) (finding right to present witnesses);
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (“Few rights are more fundamental than that
of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense.”). See generally Richard A. Nagareda,
Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1999) (discussing the history
and scope of the right to present witnesses).
146. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 429 (1969) (“The right to present evidence is, of
course, essential to the fair hearing required by the Due Process Clause.”).
147. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987) (holding that the defendant has the right
to testify and “present his own version of events in his owns words”); Washington, 388 U.S. at 19
(referring to defendant’s right to present his own “version of the facts”); In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 273 (1948) (finding “an opportunity to be heard in his defense” is one of the defendant’s
rights that is “basic in our system of jurisprudence”).
148. See supra notes 114-26 and accompanying text (discussing side effects of traditional antipsychotics), notes 131-35 and accompanying text (discussing side effects of atypical antipsychotics).
149. Although the older antipsychotics pose the greatest risk of impairing the defendant’s
ability to participate, this risk does exist with newer antipsychotic medications as well. See supra
notes 131-35 and accompanying text (discussing side effects of atypical antipsychotics).
150. The Ninth Circuit recently recognized the impact of involuntary psychotropic medication on the defendant’s ability to exercise constitutionally protected rights, holding that a defendant was entitled to retroactive application of Riggins:
We conclude that the rule announced in Riggins—that states must justify
forced medication of the defendant during a criminal trial—is a rule of criminal
procedure that implicates the kind of fundamental fairness contemplated in
Teague. . . . Adherence to the Riggins rule is thus necessary for the meaningful
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Some courts have suggested that involuntary psychotropic
medications actually enhance rather than diminish a defendant’s
ability to exercise procedural rights.151 Of course, a defendant whom
involuntary psychotropic drugs have rendered competent to stand
trial is at least slightly better able to exercise at least some of these
rights, compared to when he was incompetent to stand trial.152 On
the other hand, the argument that administering involuntary psychotropic medications benefits the defense overlooks the unfairness
of alleviating some symptoms of the defendant’s mental illness,
thereby rendering him competent to stand trial, but at the same
time exacerbating other symptoms, as well as causing a host of debilitating side effects, thereby diminishing his ability to participate
in the trial proceedings.153
2. Prejudiced Demeanor and Diminished Credibility
In addition to exercising the procedural rights necessary for
presenting a defense, one of the defendant’s roles at trial is to influence jurors in a more passive way: by simply appearing before them

protection of a defendant’s right to counsel, right to confrontation, right to present evidence, and right to a trial free from prejudice. Each of these constitutional rights lies at the heart of the procedural protections designed to ensure a
fair trial and uphold the integrity of the criminal justice system.
Flowers v. Walters, 239 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2001). The problem with the “Riggins rule” as
formulated by the Ninth Circuit is that it assumes that states can justify administering involuntary medications to a defendant during trial, an assumption that arguably is unwarranted. See
supra Part III; infra Part IV (discussing how involuntary medications during trial unjustifiably
infringe a defendant’s right to a fair trial); see also Heffernan v. Norris, 48 F.3d 331, 336 (8th Cir.
1995) (Bright, J., dissenting) (noting “the multiplicity of rights at stake in Riggins, each of which
assumes a vital role in ensuring fundamentally fair and accurate trials”).
Of course, a defendant, for a variety of reasons, may not exercise all of his trial rights (indeed, some trial rights are mutually exclusive; a defendant cannot both testify and remain silent). The government should not, however, be allowed to deprive the defendant of the opportunity to exercise any of these rights. This Note is not suggesting that the failure of a defendant to
participate fully in the trial proceedings amounts to a violation of due process; only when the
government has caused the defendant to be unable to participate fully is due process violated.
See infra note 233 and accompanying text (discussing significance of the fact that administering
involuntary medications to a defendant is a government action that precludes a defendant from
fully participating in his own trial).
151. E.g., United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 133 (D.D.C. 2001) (“Ironically, a
strong likelihood exists that medication will enhance some of Weston’s trial rights, particularly
his right to consult with counsel and to assist in his defense.”).
152. See supra note 8 (discussing competency to stand trial); see also infra notes 230-31 and
accompanying text (stressing that the requirements for competency to stand trial are minimal).
153. See supra Part III.B (discussing ways that involuntary psychotropic medications interfere with the ability to present a defense).
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in the courtroom.154 A defendant who is taking antipsychotic drugs
during trial can, because of the drug’s side effects and because of
exacerbated negative symptoms, appear emotionally unresponsive,
bored, nervous, or restless.155 None of these is likely to impress a
jury favorably.156 The potential for prejudice is perhaps greatest
when the medicated defendant testifies, because the jury may disbelieve everything that the defendant says if he does not appear
credible.157

154. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“It is a fundamental assumption of the adversary system that the trier of fact observes
the accused throughout the trial, while the accused is either on the stand or sitting at the defense table.”).
155. See supra Part III.A (discussing effects and side effects of antipsychotic drugs); see also
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychiatric Association for Petitioner at 13, Riggins v. Nevada,
504 U.S. 127 (1992) (No. 90-8466) (“By administering medication, the State may be creating a
prejudicial negative demeanor in the defendant—making him look nervous or restless, for example, or so calm or sedated as to appear bored, cold, unfeeling and unresponsive. . . . That such
effects may be subtle does not make them any less real or potentially influential.”), quoted in
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 143 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); NOLEN-HOEKSEMA, supra
note 10, at 567 (noting that antipsychotic medications “often render people groggy and passive—
surely an inappropriate state in which to attend one’s own trial”).
156. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 143-44 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“As any trial
attorney will attest, serious prejudice could result if medication inhibits the defendant’s capacity
to react and respond to the proceedings and to demonstrate remorse or compassion.”); United
States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 494 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that “the jury may be misled by the
demeanor of a defendant who appears not to care about the crime (or the victim) or who appears
overly anxious at particular moments”); see also Capitol Hill Shooter (National Public Radio
broadcast, May 16, 2001) (remarks of David Siegel, professor of law at Northeastern University)
(“If a defendant’s given a medication that makes [him] seem sleepy, and then [he’s] listening to
testimony about some terrible aspect of [his] case—people being shot, people dying, people in
terrible pain—and [he doesn’t] seem to show any emotion, then the jury listening to that or
watching that defendant can conclude this person is a cold, heartless killer.”); cf. FED. R. EVID.
403 advisory committee’s notes (acknowledging that some evidence can “induc[e] decision on a
purely emotional basis”); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (allowing disruptive defendant to be removed from courtroom, and noting that “the sight of shackles and gags might have a
significant effect on the jury’s feelings about the defendant”); Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P.
Garvey & Martin T. Wells, But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1599, 1600, 1617 (1998) (describing empirical research demonstrating that
jurors’ beliefs about a defendant’s remorse can influence sentencing, and noting, “One thing a
defendant should not do if he hopes to convince jurors of his remorse is look bored.”).
157. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If the defendant takes the stand, as Riggins did, his demeanor can have a great bearing on his credibility
and persuasiveness, and on the degree to which he evokes sympathy.”); WINICK, supra note 8, at
295 (“The side effects of medication may so alter the defendant’s demeanor that the trier of fact
forms the impression that his testimony lacks credibility.”). Many courts routinely instruct jurors
to consider demeanor when evaluating the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., 1A KEVIN F.
O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG, & HON. WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 10.01, at 48 (5th ed. 2000) (specifying that the judge should instruct the jury
that among the factors it may consider in deciding whether to believe a witness is the witness’s
“manner of testifying”); see also Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483, 488 (4th Cir. 1963) (“It has long
been a well-recognized and accepted principle that the appraisal of the value and weight of the
testimony of a witness is to be based not only upon consideration of his spoken word but also
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The seminal case recognizing that the government’s manipulation of a defendant’s appearance can violate the defendant’s right
to a fair trial is Estelle v. Williams.158 In Estelle, the Supreme Court
held that the government impermissibly prejudices a defendant by
compelling him to appear before the jury wearing a prison uniform.159 Compelling a defendant to appear in handcuffs or other
visible physical restraints can similarly deprive the defendant of a
fair trial.160 Admittedly, prison uniforms and physical restraints
directly contradict the presumption of innocence161 in a way that
psychotropic medications might not. With psychotropic medications,
the challenge to the presumption of innocence may be less direct:
medications can cause a defendant to appear apathetic and coldhearted, or nervous and lacking in credibility, thereby diminishing
the jury’s ability to continue believing that the defendant is innocent.162 Even though the threat posed by medication might be less
direct, compelling a defendant to take psychotropic medications and
compelling a defendant to appear in a prison uniform or visible restraints are alike in one respect: in both situations, the government
is manipulating the jury’s impression of the defendant in a way
that certainly will impact, and may well determine, the jury’s verdict.163

upon observation of his manner of testifying, his demeanor on the witness stand, his gestures,
his inflections, his frankness or evasiveness, his intelligence and the reasonableness of his
statements.”). Textbooks on witness preparation stress that demeanor is an important tool that
jurors use to assess credibility: “Evaluations of credibility are heavily influenced by perceptions
of trustworthiness. . . . Nonverbal communication and behavior are the primary sources of positive evaluations [of a witness’s trustworthiness]. Mannerisms, tone of voice, facial expressions,
touch, smiles; jurors evaluate all of these.” V. HALE STARR, WITNESS PREPARATION § 7.1.3 (2000).
158. 425 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1976).
159. Id. (holding that “the State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes”).
160. See Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Generally, a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to appear before a jury free of shackles.” (citing Wilson v.
McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 1484 (9th Cir. 1985))); see also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL
& NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.2(e), at 466 (2d ed. 1999) (noting a general “right to
appear before the jury free from shackles or other physical restraints”).
161. See Estelle, 425 U.S. at 504-05 (“Courts have . . . determined that an accused should not
be compelled to go to trial in prison or jail clothing because of the possible impairment of the
presumption [of innocence] so basic to the adversary system.”); see also 2 LAFAVE, ISRAEL &
KING, supra note 160, § 24.2(e), at 465 (“Because this presumption [of innocence] is likely to be
impaired if the defendant is required to stand trial in prison or jail clothing, the courts have
rather consistently held that such a procedure is improper.”).
162. See supra Part III.B (discussing ways that psychotropic drugs interfere with the ability
to present a defense).
163. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“At all stages of the proceedings, the defendant’s behavior, manner, facial expressions,
and emotional responses, or their absence, combine to make an overall impression on the trier of
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3. Altered Evidence of Mental State
Those who are insane164 have long been excused from legal
responsibility for behaviors that would otherwise constitute criminal offenses.165 Presently, federal law recognizes insanity as an affirmative defense,166 as do the criminal codes of most states.167 Some

fact, an impression that can have a powerful influence on the outcome of the trial.”); see also
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychiatric Association for Petitioner at 13, Riggins v. Nevada,
504 U.S. 127 (1992) (No. 90-8466) (arguing that involuntary medication “may tilt the balance of
the adversary system against the accused”); supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (indicating that the jury can be misled by the defendant’s drug-affected demeanor). The Supreme Court
of New Jersey recently held that a defendant was entitled to a new trial after “testifying before
the jury in a visibly disheveled state,” which had resulted from being “denied [while in jail awaiting trial] the basic necessities such as food, soap, water, a clean mattress and blanket, and a
comb.” State v. Maisonet, 763 A.2d 1254, 1256 (N.J. 2001). The court concluded, “That defendant’s overall appearance, caused by factors beyond his control, may have unduly impugned his
credibility in the eyes of jurors is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. at 1260.
Some courts have cited an additional reason for prohibiting the handcuffing or shackling of a
defendant, which applies equally to administering involuntary medications: “[T]he fact that a
prisoner appears in shackles may, to some extent, deprive him of the free and calm use of all his
faculties. The result would be a denial of the fair trial guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution . . . .” State v. Roberts, 206 A.2d 200, 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1965) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
164. “Insane” is not a term of art in psychiatry or psychology. Instead, the term “insane” is
defined by statutes that allow insanity as a defense. Thus, “insane” means whatever a given
legislature decides that it means. See DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 10, at 536 (“Insanity is a
legal concept, not a psychiatric or psychological concept.”). The traditional definition of insanity
comes from the 1843 English case of M’Naghten. Under M’Naghten, insanity means that “at the
time of the committing of the act, the party accused was lab[o]ring under such a defect of reason,
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he
did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.” M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep.
718, 722 (1843). Since M’Naghten, various other tests of insanity have been proposed, including
the irresistible impulse test, the Durham test, and the ALI Model Penal Code test. See RICHARD
J. BONNIE, JOHN C. JEFFERIES, JR. & PETER W. LOW, A CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE:
THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. 14-20 (2d ed. 2000). Research suggests, however, that
juries’ decisions are not much influenced by the particular test they are instructed to apply. See
STANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 955-56 (6th ed. 1995) (describing research demonstrating that “[t]here is little
evidence that different formulations of the insanity defense produce different results in practice”).
165. See Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 777, 781 n.5 (1985) (“The modern insanity defense dates at least from Hadfield’s
case.” (citing Rex v. Hadfield, 27 State Trials 1281 (1800))); BONNIE, JEFFRIES & LOW, supra note
164, at 7 (“From the earliest times, the courts and legislatures have provided for ‘tests’ of criminal responsibility that, if satisfied, would result in an acquittal of crime.”).
166. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1994).
167. See Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in
Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1200 n.2 (2000) (noting that “[f]ive states have abolished
the [insanity] defense” (citing IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220
(1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-214 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.035 (Michie 1997);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1999))); see also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1952)
(upholding the constitutionality of not recognizing insanity as a defense).
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states also recognize other defenses, such as partial responsibility,
that reduce culpability based on a defendant’s abnormal mental
state at the time the offense was committed.168 Additionally, a defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense is almost always
relevant in a criminal trial, given the prosecution’s usual burden of
proving that the defendant had the requisite mens rea to be convicted of the charged offense.169
Legal scholars have offered various ethical and moral bases
for the insanity defense.170 Juries, however, along with the rest of

168. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 960 P.2d 877, 884 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that “a defense of ‘partial responsibility’ is available when ‘knowing’ conduct is charged” (interpreting OR.
REV. STAT. § 161.300 (1990))). See generally Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Law: Undiminished
Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 20 (1984) (“Partial responsibility is a form of lesser legal insanity: The defendant is claiming that, as a result of mental
abnormality, he is not fully responsible for the crime proven against him.”).
169. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“Our rule permits
the introduction of expert testimony as to abnormal condition if it is relevant to negative, or
establish, the specific mental condition that is an element of the crime.”); see also Slobogin, supra
note 167, at 1200 n.2 (noting that all states that have abolished the insanity defense have “maintain[ed] the mens rea alternative”). This “mens rea alternative” resembles one variant of what
has been called the “diminished capacity” defense. See Morse, supra note 168, at 1 (indicating
that the “mens rea variant” of diminished capacity “allows a criminal defendant to introduce
evidence of mental abnormality at trial . . . to negate a mental element of the crime charged,
thereby exonerating the defendant of that charge”). The defendant’s mental state is of course not
relevant when the defendant is charged with a strict liability offense. Additionally, states can
impose limitations on the kinds of evidence a defendant can present regarding his mental state
at the time of the offense. See, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (holding that a
Montana statute, which prohibited a defendant from introducing evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate the mens rea of a charged offense, did not violate due process).
170. For example, Stephen J. Morse writes:
The basic moral issue regarding the insanity defense is whether it is just to
hold responsible and punish a person who was extremely crazy at the time of
the offense. Those who believe that the insanity defense should be abolished
must claim either that no defendant is extremely crazy at the time of the offense or that it is morally proper to convict and punish such people. Neither
claim is easy to justify.
Morse, supra note 165, at 780; see also Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 437 (1914) (“The sine qua
non of all crimes and misdemeanors at law is a criminal intent. . . . Insane persons are incapable
of entertaining a criminal intent, and therefore incapable of committing a crime.” (citing treatises HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN; HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN; BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL
LAW)); ABRAHAM GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 13-14 (1967) (“[T]he insanity defense describes the man who is sufficiently different from the rest of us that he cannot be used as an
effective example and who, in quite personal terms, cannot be expected to approach events mindful of the warnings sent to him by the criminal code.”), quoted in RALPH REISNER, CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN & ARTI RAI, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 517
(3d ed. 1999). For an in-depth discussion, see Michael S. Moore, Legal Conceptions of Mental
Illness, in MENTAL ILLNESS: LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 25 (Baruch A. Brody & H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. eds., 1980).

2002]

TRIAL RIGHTS AND PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS

197

the general public, tend to dislike the insanity defense.171 One reason for the dislike of the insanity defense is the perception that it
allows many defendants to “get away with” their crimes.172 Because
mental states must be inferred from the words and actions of a defendant rather than observed directly or measured objectively, the
possibility exists that a defendant is malingering,173 or trying to
deceive the jury into believing that he was insane at the time of the
offense.174 Attitudes towards the insanity defense are not helped
when expert witnesses, such as psychiatrists, are perceived as willing to say whatever it is that they are hired to say.175 In recent
years, especially following the verdict in the John Hinckley case,176
legislatures have made the criteria for successfully presenting an

171. See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 198 (1986) (noting “a great
deal of negative feeling toward the insanity defense,” including “public negativism” and “juries
that are, on the whole, suspicious of the insanity plea”).
172. See id. at 186 (describing research findings that “people drastically overestimate the use
and success of the insanity plea” and mistakenly believe that “the insanity defense allows dangerous people to go free”); see also NOLEN-HOEKSEMA, supra note 10, at 682 (“The lay public
often thinks of the insanity defense as a means by which guilty people ‘get off.’ “).
173. The DSM defines malingering as “the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives such as avoiding
military duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial compensation, evading criminal prosecution, or
obtaining drugs.” DSM-IV-TR, supra note 15, at 739.
174. See United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1984) (Rubin, J., dissenting)
(“Public opposition to any insanity-grounded offense is often based, either explicitly or implicitly,
on the view that the plea is frequently invoked by violent criminals who use it to fraudulently
evade just punishment.”); HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 171, at 195 (discussing results of a study
indicating that some jurors are “distrustful of schizophrenic defendants and concerned that they
might be making up their mental problems literally to get away with murder” but are less distrustful of “defendants suffering from organic problems [who] could not have generated them
merely as an excuse”). Concerns about fraud are, of course, not unique to the insanity defense,
but exist in most trials.
175. See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1126 (1997) (describing research finding
that “[j]urors commonly believed that experts would skew their testimony for ‘whomever is paying for their testimony’ ”); see also Daniel Slater & Valerie P. Hans, Public Opinion of Forensic
Psychiatry Following the Hinckley Verdict, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 675, 676 (1984) (reporting
that after the Hinckley verdict, more than sixty percent of the public had either “no confidence”
or only “slight confidence” in expert psychiatric testimony); George F. Will, Insanity and Success,
WASH. POST, June 23, 1982, at A27 (“Psychiatry as practiced by some of today’s itinerant experts-for-hire is this century’s alchemy. No, that is unfair to alchemists, who were confused but
honest. Some of today’s rent-a-psychiatry is charlatanism laced with cynicism.”), quoted in
BONNIE, JEFFRIES & LOW, supra note 164, at 132.
176. See Peter Perl, Public that Saw Reagan Shot Expresses Shock at the Verdict, WASH.
POST, June 23, 1982, at A8 (discussing reaction to jury’s finding that John Hinckley was not
guilty by reason of insanity of charges related to the shooting of President Reagan and others);
see also United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1348, 1350-51 (D.D.C. 1981), aff’d, 672
F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that the prosecution’s use of evidence obtained from a courtordered psychiatric examination did not violate the defendant’s privilege against selfincrimination).
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insanity defense more difficult; for example, most jurisdictions now
require that the defendant prove insanity by clear and convincing
evidence.177 Thus, a defendant who claims that he is not guilty by
reason of insanity faces an uphill battle.178
The “battle” is made even more difficult by the administration of psychotropic medications, which alleviate the symptoms—or
evidence179—of insanity. Medications alter the evidence of insanity
in two ways. First, medications affect the way that a defendant, if
he chooses to testify, describes his mental state at the time of the
offense. Antipsychotic drugs alleviate those symptoms of a mental
illness, such as delusions and hallucinations, that would be most

177. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 164, at 953 (“Responses to the Hinckley verdict
. . . included adjustments in the burden of proof, changes in the disposition of insanity acquittees,
introduction of a separate verdict of ‘guilty but mentally ill’ and complete abolition of the insanity defense.”); see also Morse, supra note 165, at 779 (“The shock generated by the verdict in the
Hinckley case has revived recurrent criticism and efforts to abolish or reform the insanity defense.” (citations omitted)).
178. See Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals
in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 477 (1980) (noting that “the factfinder is likely to view with considerable skepticism the defendant’s claim that
he did not function as would a normal person under the circumstances”); Sundby, supra note
175, at 1139 (describing research demonstrating that “[i]n sum, experts’ explanations of human
behavior that run contrary to notions of free will are hard to sell to the jury”). Not all incompetent detainees, if they become competent to stand trial, will want to argue an insanity defense,
given that acquittal by reason of insanity can mean an indeterminate commitment to a psychiatric treatment facility. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983) (“There simply is no
necessary correlation between severity of the offense and length of time necessary for recovery.
The length of the acquittee’s hypothetical criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his commitment.”). Additionally, insanity defenses rarely succeed. See DAVISON &
NEALE, supra note 10, at 531 (“A staggering amount has been written on the insanity defense,
even though it is pleaded in less than 1 percent of all cases that reach trial and is rarely successful.”); KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 164, at 955 (“Nationally, insanity acquittals probably
represent no more than 0.25 percent of terminated felony prosecutions.” (citation omitted)). On
the other hand, defendants who were so seriously mentally ill as to be incompetent to stand trial
may well want to present a partial responsibility or a diminished capacity defense, see supra
notes 168-69, which may be easier for the defendant to establish than insanity and may not
subject the defendant to indefinite civil commitment. These variations of the insanity defense,
like the insanity defense itself, are especially important in cases, such as that of Russell Weston
or Andrea Yates, in which the defendant cannot plausibly deny committing the actus reus of the
charged offense. See An Insane System, WASH. POST, July 30, 2001, at A14 (“The key facts here
are not debatable. There is little doubt that Mr. Weston committed the horrifying crimes with
which he is charged. Yet the notion of legal insanity has no meaning if it does not describe
him.”); Texas Mother’s Murder Trial Set for Jan. 7, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2001, at A2 (“Yates’[s]
lawyers allege that she was suffering from a psychotic form of postpartum depression on June 20
when she drowned her children.”).
179. Cf. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“When the State commands medication during the pretrial and trial phases of the case for
the avowed purpose of changing the defendant’s behavior, the concerns are much the same as if
it were alleged that the prosecution had manipulated material evidence.” (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963))).
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likely to convince a jury that the defendant was insane at the time
of the offense.180 At trial, a defendant who is taking psychotropic
drugs, and is therefore no longer hallucinating or delusional, may
be able to describe these symptoms (if at all) only in a calm, detached, or dreamlike manner.181 The defendant’s inability to convey
the phenomenological experience of his psychotic symptoms may
cause the jury to conclude that, at the time of the offense, the defendant was not suffering from any kind of mental abnormality, or
at least not from a mental abnormality serious enough to cause insanity.182 Second, medications can alter the defendant’s demeanor
during the trial: a defendant taking a traditional antipsychotic
medication is unlikely to appear insane, and a defendant taking a
newer antipsychotic may appear completely well.183 This appearance of sanity at the time of the trial will make all the more unbelievable to a jury the defendant’s claim that a serious mental illness

180. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text (indicating that antipsychotics are most
effective in alleviating positive symptoms).
181. See United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 133 (D.D.C. 2001) (noting that Weston’s psychiatrist “testified that antipsychotic medication might cause Weston to filter out events
that might be too disturbing for him to cope with or to recount events as one would recount a
dream” (citation to transcript omitted)); see also supra text accompanying note 105 (indicating
that antipsychotic medications can cause sedation and apathy).
182. Judge Tatel’s concurring opinion in Weston describes this problem in compelling detail:
Rendering Weston nondelusional may impair his ability to mount an effective
insanity defense. . . . A jury listening to a non-delusional Weston explain, perhaps quite passively, that at the time of the crime he believed he had to save
the world from the Ruby Satellite System will be considerably more skeptical
than a jury that sees and hears the person Dr. Johnson saw and heard: Russell
Weston, delusional and unmedicated, explaining in the present tense that there
is a “Ruby Satellite System” and that he in fact went to the Capitol in search of
the override console to save the country from “human corpses rotting, turning
black, and spreading the most deadliest disease known to mankind.”
United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring); cf. Benjamin B.
Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental
Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1415 (1986) (“Irrationality is a vital aspect of the exculpatory nature of insanity because rationality is an essential attribute of intelligible conduct, of
behavior an observer, such as a jury, can interpret.”).
183. See supra notes 114, 129-30 and accompanying text (noting that traditional antipsychotics alleviate the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, while atypicals can alleviate positive and
negative symptoms). This is the mirror image of the problem that occurs with credibility, creating a Catch-22 situation: psychotropic medications will either produce side effects, causing the
jury to believe that the defendant is cold-hearted or is lying, or will not produce side effects,
causing the jury to believe that the defendant was not suffering from a mental defect at the time
of the crime. Either way, the defendant that the jury sees, and perhaps convicts, is a creation of
the government’s decision to administer involuntary psychotropic drugs. See JOSEPH HELLER,
CATCH-22 54 (1955) (“Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as
soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions. . . . If he flew
them he was crazy and didn’t have to; but if he didn’t want to he was sane and had to.”).
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caused him to be unable to distinguish right from wrong, or to resist doing what he knew was wrong.184
Evidence of the defendant’s mental state at the time of the
offense is especially important when the defendant is asserting a
defense of insanity, because the defendant is in effect admitting to
the actus reus of the crime and denying only the mens rea element.185 Thus, the only issue in contention at trial is the mental
state of the defendant at the time of the offense, an issue the jury
cannot help but decide based on its observations of the defendant
during the trial.186
The practice of instructing the jury to consider the defendant’s manner of testifying when evaluating an insanity defense
further suggests that altering the way the defendant describes his
mental state at the time of the offense will influence the jury’s assessment of the defendant’s guilt.187 Also, the ability of a defendant

184. See Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1983) (“If the defendant
appears calm and controlled at trial, the jury may well discount any testimony that the defendant lacked, at the time of the crime, substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct or to conform the conduct to the requirements of the law.”); DAVISON & NEALE,
supra note 10, at 539 (“If the defendant appears normal, the jury may be less likely to believe
that the crime was an act of a disturbed mental state rather than of free will . . . .”); John Conley,
William O’Barr & E. Allen Lind, The Power of Language: Presentational Style in the Courtroom,
1978 DUKE L.J. 1375, 1399 (concluding that a witness’s “testimonial style exerts a strong influence on the jury’s perception of the substance of testimony”).
185. Many courts treat a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and a plea of guilty similarly, requiring a judge, before accepting the plea, to determine that the defendant is making the
plea knowingly and voluntarily. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Shegrud, 389 N.W.2d 7, 12-15 (Wis. 1986)
(finding defendant’s plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was made freely, knowingly and
voluntarily); see also Justine A. Dunlap, What’s Competence Got to Do with It: The Right Not to
Be Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 495, 515- 517 (1997) (describing similar
cases).
186. See DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 10, at 539 (“[J]uries form their judgments of legal responsibility or insanity at least in part on how the defendant appears during the trial.”); see also
Lawrence v. State, 454 S.E.2d 446, 451 (Ga. 1995) (“We find merit in the argument that a State’s
compliance with the requirements in Riggins fails to address adequately an accused’s interest in
the impact his medicated demeanor may have upon the jury’s evaluation of his sanity.”);
Louraine, 453 N.E.2d at 442 (“In a case where an insanity defense is raised, the jury are likely to
assess the weight of the various pieces of evidence before them with reference to the defendant’s
demeanor.”).
187. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychiatric Association for Petitioner at 12,
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (No. 90-8466) (noting that “the trial court instructed the
jury to consider Riggins’[s] ‘manner upon the stand’ when assessing the credibility of his insanity
defense”). Courts commonly instruct juries to consider a witness’s “manner on the stand” when
assessing credibility. See supra note 157; see also State v. Johnson, 751 A.2d 298, 362 (Conn.
2000) (“Courts have held that, when the defendant has placed his mental state or character in
issue, the jury properly may be asked to consider the defendant’s courtroom demeanor.” (citations omitted)). In addition to instructions from the court, the prosecutor may urge the jury to
consider the defendant’s courtroom demeanor as evidence against a claim of insanity. See Commonwealth v. Hunter, 695 N.E.2d 653, 657 (Mass. 1998) (“Where the defendant’s sanity is at
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who is taking psychotropic medications to inform the jury about the
effects of these medications implies a recognition that the jury may
draw erroneous conclusions about the defendant’s guilt based on
the defendant’s drug-affected presentation at trial.188 Other methods by which a defendant might be allowed to provide information
to the jury about the effects and side effects of psychotropic drugs
administered during trial, methods such as discontinuing the drugs
briefly so that the defendant can testify in an unmedicated state,
similarly acknowledge that psychotropic medications can affect the
defendant’s functioning in ways that will influence the jury’s verdict.189

issue, the prosecution may alert jurors to inconsistencies between the defendant’s conduct at
trial and his alleged mental illness.” (citing Commonwealth v. Smiledge, 643 N.E.2d 41 (Mass.
1994))).
188. See Commonwealth v. Gurney, 595 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Mass. 1992) (holding that defendant had the right to inform the jury that he was taking antidepressants during the trial because
this fact “should have been considered by the jury when assessing [the defendant’s] character
and credibility, as well as deciding whether he possessed the specific intent to commit the crimes
charged”). At least one state, Florida, has enacted a statute mandating that the judge, at the
request of the defendant, inform the jury that the defendant is taking psychotropic medications,
when the medications are necessary to maintain the defendant’s competency to stand trial. FLA.
R. CRIM. P. 3.215(c)(2) (“If the defendant proceeds to trial with the aid of medication for a mental
or emotional condition, on the motion of defense counsel, the jury shall, at the beginning of the
trial and in the charge to the jury, be given explanatory instructions regarding such medication.”); see also Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148, 158 (Fla. 1998) (holding that instructions are
required “only when the defendant’s ability to proceed to trial is because of such [psychotropic]
medication”). The inability of such instructions to protect trial rights adequately is discussed
infra Part IV.A.
189. See State v. Garcia, 658 A.2d 947, 974-75 (Conn. 1995) (“The accused in a criminal trial
has the right to present himself to the jury—in speech, appearance and personality—as he really
is at the time of trial, and probably was at the time he allegedly committed the crime. In other
words, he has the right to be himself without modification of his personality through the forced
administration of antipsychotic drugs.”); State v. Posby, 574 N.W.2d 398, 403 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997) (reversing conviction and remanding for new trial when the trial court refused to allow the
defendant to discontinue psychotropic medication three days before he was scheduled to testify,
“so that the jury could observe defendant in the manner he was at the time of the shooting (that
is, not on any medication)”), vacated due to death of defendant, 583 N.W.2d 458 (Mich. 1998); see
also Commonwealth v. Gaboriault, No. CR 9673CR290A-B, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 127, at *75
(Mass. Super. Apr. 4, 2001) (citations omitted):
A defendant is entitled to place before the jury any evidence which is at all probative of his mental condition. Thus, where a defendant argues that he lacked
criminal intent due to a mental illness, the State and Federal Constitutions
may require that the defendant be afforded an opportunity to have a jury observe him in an unmedicated state.
Problems with discontinuing psychotropic medications to allow the jury to observe the defendant
while he is in an unmedicated state are discussed infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONSIDERING POTENTIAL COUNTERARGUMENTS
A. Prejudicial Effects Cannot Be Cured by Jury Instructions or
Additional Evidence
A trial must be fair, but it need not be perfect.190 Generally,
trial defects, even those undeniably prejudicial to the defense, can
be cured by measures such as instructions to the jury or the admission of additional evidence, including the testimony of expert and
lay witnesses.191 Some defects, though, create prejudice that so undermines the fairness of the trial that curative measures are insufficient.192 A key question, then, is whether jury instructions, witness testimony, or any other additional measures can cure the
prejudicial effects of administering involuntary psychotropic drugs
to a defendant during trial. So long as a substantial threat exists
that these drugs will violate the defendant’s constitutional right to
a fair trial (which arguably is always193), courts should not allow a

190. See United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring)
(“[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.” (quoting
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986))).
191. In Weston, for example, the district court proposed a variety of methods for explaining to
the jury the effects and side effects of involuntary medications, methods that the court suggested
would protect Weston’s right to a fair trial:
If Weston is medicated and his competency is restored, the Court is willing to
take whatever reasonable measures are necessary to ensure that his rights are
protected. This may include informing the jurors that Weston is being administered mind-altering medication, that his behavior in their presence is conditioned on drugs being administered to him at the request of the government,
and allowing experts and others to testify regarding Weston’s unmedicated condition, the effects of the medication on Weston, and the necessity of medication
to render Weston competent to stand trial.
United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 137 (D.D.C. 2001). The court’s willingness to allow
jury instructions, expert testimony, lay testimony, and whatever other measures the court might
find reasonable, belies the conclusion that any of these (or any other) methods will truly guard
against an unfair conviction. See infra Part IV (discussing inadequacy of such measures).
192. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-37 (1968). In Bruton, the Court found
the judge’s “concededly clear” instructions to the jury to ignore the inadmissible hearsay statements of one codefendant when determining the guilt of another codefendant inadequate to “substitute for petitioner’s constitutional right of cross-examination.” Id. at 137; see also Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965) (“It is true that in most cases involving claims of due process
deprivations we require a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless, at times
a procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is
deemed inherently lacking in due process.”).
193. See infra notes 235-39 and accompanying text (proposing that a court cannot determine
that a defendant’s rights will not be violated by involuntary medications).
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defendant who is being administered involuntary psychotropic
drugs to be brought to trial.194
Administering involuntary antipsychotic drugs violates the
right to a fair trial in three ways: by diminishing the defendant’s
ability to exercise procedural rights, by prejudicing the defendant’s
demeanor, and by altering evidence of the defendant’s mental state
at the time of the offense.195 Diminishing the defendant’s ability to
exercise procedural rights is incurable both in theory and in practice.196 While prejudicing the defendant’s demeanor and altering
evidence of the defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense
are perhaps curable in theory, are not curable in practice.197
1. Interference with the Exercise of Procedural Rights
The prejudice caused by diminishing the defendant’s ability
to exercise procedural rights is completely unamenable to cure, because neither the instructions of a judge, the testimony of defense
witnesses, nor the introduction of any other kind of evidence can
demonstrate to the jury how the defendant would have interacted
differently with his attorney, responded differently to prosecution
witnesses, or testified differently had he not been medicated.198

194. Cf. Estes, 381 U.S. at 564 (“[T]he criminal trial under our Constitution has a clearly defined purpose, to provide a fair and reliable determination of guilt, and no procedure or occurrence which seriously threatens to divert it from that purpose can be tolerated.”); Riggins v.
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 141 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that unless
the government can “make a showing that there is no significant risk that the medication will
impair or alter in any material way the defendant’s capacity or willingness to react to the testimony at trial or to assist his counsel,” the defendant may not be administered involuntary medications); Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137 (“[T]he introduction of [codefendant] Evans’[s] confession posed
a substantial threat to petitioner’s right to confront the witnesses against him, and this is a
hazard we cannot ignore.”); Hamilton v. Vasquez, 17 F.3d 1149, 1169 (9th Cir. 1994) (Trott, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added) (noting “the long-standing principle . . . that jurors
are presumed to follow admonitory instructions given by the court unless the information they
are ordered to disregard posed a ‘substantial threat’ to a defendant’s Constitutional rights” (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137)).
195. See supra Part III.B.
196. See infra Part IV.A.1.
197. See infra Part IV.A.2-3.
198. Justice Thomas’s dissent in Riggins was based in part on this problem of determining
which of the defendant’s behaviors to attribute to the defendant himself and which to attribute to
the medication: “[Riggins] has not stated how he would have directed his counsel to examine or
cross-examine witnesses differently. He has not identified any testimony or instructions that he
did not understand.” Riggins, 504 U.S. at 149-50 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The difficulty of pointing to discrete instances of prejudice, however, is part of the reason that the majority decided
that Riggins was entitled to a new trial. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137; see also Yohn v. Love, 887
F. Supp. 773, 786 n.21 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (noting that some “errors may require automatic invalida-
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Furthermore, even if such demonstrations were possible, they
would not compensate for the defendant’s lost opportunity actually
to interact with his attorney, respond to witnesses, or testify in his
own words.199
2. Prejudiced Demeanor and Diminished Credibility
The effect of involuntary psychotropic drugs on a defendant’s
demeanor, because it involves the presentation of a kind of evidence
rather than the exercise of procedural rights, is at least in theory
more amenable to cure.200 In reality, though, the prejudice caused
by the defendant’s drug-altered demeanor cannot be separated from
everything else that happens at trial.201 Arguably, the most curable
kind of prejudice results from a discrete event, such as an improper
act by the prosecutor or an inadmissible statement by a witness.
When prejudice is caused by a particular event, a judge can usually
instruct the jury to disregard that event.202 Similarly, the judge can
instruct the jury about how to consider particular, identifiable
items of evidence—with reference to one codefendant but not to another, for example.203 Meaningfully instructing a jury regarding in-

tion of a conviction . . . because prejudice is so likely to occur but so difficult to prove” (citing
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 127)).
199. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137-38 (“We also are persuaded that allowing Riggins to present expert testimony about the effect of Mellaril on his demeanor did nothing to cure the possibility that the substance of his own testimony, his interaction with counsel, or his comprehension
at trial were compromised by forced administration of Mellaril.”); see also Bruton, 391 U.S. at
135-37 (holding that jury instructions could not compensate for the inability to cross-examine
prosecution witness).
200. Many courts have suggested that the prejudicial effects on the defendant’s demeanor
can be cured. See, e.g., United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Henderson, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he testimony of both lay and expert witnesses, whether on direct or cross, will
suffice to address any differences in Weston’s appearance.”); People v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787,
797 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (“[W]e believe that informing the jury of [defendant’s] drugged condition adequately protected his right to testify.”); Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535, 538 (Nev. 1991)
(“In this case, there was ample expert testimony regarding the effect that the Mellaril had on
Riggins. . . . [W]e are persuaded that expert testimony was sufficient to inform the jury of the
effect of the Mellaril on Riggins’[s] demeanor and testimony.”), rev’d, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
201. Cf. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The side effects
of antipsychotic drugs may alter demeanor in a way that will prejudice all facets of the defense.”).
202. See infra note 211 (arguing that prejudice from discrete factors is more curable than
prejudice from continuous factors). In some instances, of course, instructions will be insufficient
to cure prejudice caused even by a discrete factor. See Aguilar v. Alexander, 125 F.3d 815, 820
(9th Cir. 1997) (“There are some extreme situations in which curative instructions will not neutralize the prejudice when evidence is improperly admitted.”).
203. FED. R. EVID. 105 (“When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon
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voluntary psychotropic drugs would require the judge to tell the
jury to disregard, or to consider in some limited way, not an event
but an effect; or rather, myriad effects, which the judge would likely
have considerable difficulty specifying.204 Even if a judge were to
attempt such complex instructions, the complexity of the instructions would likely limit the ability of jurors to follow them.205 On
the other hand, simply informing the jury that the defendant is being administered psychotropic drugs seems unlikely to be very
curative: instructions that do not explain how these drugs are affecting the defendant and how the jury should consider this information seem unlikely to avert the jury from basing its assessment
of the defendant’s character, credibility, or guilt on its observations
of the defendant’s drug-induced appearance, testimony, and behavior in the courtroom. A problem with explicit instructions, however,
is that if the defendant is allowed to introduce evidence about the
effects and side effects of psychotropic medications, then instructions by the court concerning these medications might be considered an invasion of the jury’s fact-finding province.206
Allowing the defendant to present additional evidence about
the effects of involuntary psychotropic drugs is no more likely to
cure the prejudice caused by these drugs than are instructions from
the court. For example, testimony could be provided by an expert
witness such as a psychiatrist, who could inform the jury that in his
opinion, involuntary psychotropic drugs are causing the defendant
to experience certain side effects. Of course, the prosecutor would
undoubtedly have his own expert psychiatrist, who would inform
the jury that in his opinion, the drugs are not causing the defen-

request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”). Evidence against one codefendant that is prejudicial to a second codefendant, however, may be
grounds for severance of the defendants. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 (“If it appears that a defendant or
the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of
counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.”).
204. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 141 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that “the
inquiry itself is elusive, for it assumes some baseline of normality that experts may have some
difficulty in establishing for a particular defendant, if they can establish it at all”); DSM-IV-TR,
supra note 15, at 301 (describing difficulties that clinicians experience in distinguishing antipsychotic side effects from negative symptoms); see also supra note 198 (discussing difficulty of
identifying precise effects of psychotropic drugs).
205. Cf. Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework
Testimony, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 164-66 (1989) (summarizing empirical research
demonstrating the ineffectiveness of complex jury instructions about eyewitness identification
testimony).
206. See People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 177 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (“The giving of this instruction
[regarding involuntary medication] would have been improper because it would have directed the
jury to accept, as fact, part of a witness’[s] testimony.”).
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dant to experience those side effects. Such a duel of the experts
would likely leave the jury confused at best.207 Furthermore, even if
a jury did accept completely a defense expert’s assessment that the
defendant’s demeanor at trial reflected drug-induced side effects
rather than character or personality traits,208 and thus the jury did
not count the defendant’s apparent apathy or anxiety against him,
the jury would still have no positive or affirmative demeanor evidence to count in the defendant’s favor.209 Unlike most incidents at
trial that prejudice the defense, allowing the government to present
its evidence—the defendant in a drug-altered state—denies the de-

207. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing widespread skepticism regarding
psychiatrists testifying as expert witnesses). While this confusion exists to some extent in every
case involving expert witnesses, the point here is only that the problems associated with expert
testimony, particularly expert testimony from a psychiatrist, mean that the defense does not
have an adequate means of curing the government-created prejudice resulting from involuntary
medications.
208. Jurors will be predisposed, however, to explain the defendant’s appearance and behavior
not in terms of transient, environmental influences such as medication effects, but in terms of
dispositional factors such as the defendant’s character or personality. Social psychologists have
labeled this bias towards dispositional explanations of the behavior of others the “fundamental
attribution error.” See Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific
Expert Testimony on Juror Decision Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
267, 279 (2001) (noting that the fundamental attribution error “causes individuals to incorrectly
perceive that another’s behavior is based on stable dispositions (i.e., traits) rather than situational contexts”). For a detailed discussion of the psychological research, see LEE ROSS &
RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
(1991). Furthermore, overcoming this cognitive bias towards dispositional attributions, and convincing jurors to attribute a defendant’s appearance and behavior to an unstable and external
factor such as medication, is likely to be difficult because of belief perseverance, another cognitive bias. See Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial
Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 691 (2000) (“Research in the area of belief perseverance has demonstrated that once individuals form a belief,
the belief becomes highly resistant to change and influences how they perceive and construct
future information.”). For a discussion of the psychological research, see Lee Ross & Craig A.
Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 144, 144-52
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
209. See Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1983):
The ability to present expert testimony describing the effect of medication on
the defendant is not an adequate substitute. At best, such testimony would
serve only to mitigate the unfair prejudice which may accrue to the defendant
as a consequence of his controlled outward appearance. It cannot compensate
for the positive value to the defendant’s case of his own demeanor in an unmedicated condition.[;]
see also State v. Posby, 574 N.W.2d 398, 403 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (finding expert testimony
insufficient to compensate for the lost value of allowing the jury to observe defendant unmedicated).

2002]

TRIAL RIGHTS AND PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS

207

fense the opportunity to present its evidence: the defendant in a
nondrug-altered state.210
Additionally, jurors cannot reasonably be expected to disregard the days or perhaps weeks that they observed the defendant
sitting before them sedated and drooling, or agitated and twitching,211 or that they listened to the defendant testify about the crime
in a rational and disinterested manner.212 As the Supreme Court
suggested in Bruton v. United States, the ability to follow some instructions is simply beyond the practical, human limitations of the
jury system.213 The Supreme Court also has held that, on appeal,
some defects are not subject to harmless error analysis but require
automatic reversal.214 These “structural errors”215 cannot be considered harmless both because “it is so difficult to measure their effects on a jury’s decision,”216 and because they “undermin[e] the

210. Cf. 2 LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 160, § 27.6(d), at 471 (“[M]ost errors at
trial . . . relate to the introduction or evaluation of particular items of evidence.”).
211. Events that are isolated are less likely to produce incurable prejudice than events that
are extended. Compare United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 242 (1940) (holding that the prosecutor’s statements, though apparently improper, were not prejudicial because
they were “isolated, casual episodes”), with Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1976)
(“[T]he constant reminder of the accused’s condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable
attire may affect a juror’s judgment. The defendant’s clothing is so likely to be a continuing influence throughout the trial that . . . an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors
coming into play.” (emphasis added)). The effects and side effects of antipsychotic drugs are
discussed supra Part III.A.
212. See supra notes 157, 181-82 and accompanying text (discussing how antipsychotic drugs
affect a defendant’s testimony).
213. According to the standard suggested by the Supreme Court in Bruton, prejudice is incurable when “the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the
consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the
jury system cannot be ignored.” 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968).
214. The Supreme Court first decided that a violation of the Constitution could be “harmless”
in the 1967 case of Chapman v. California. See 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (finding that a violation of
the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent could be harmless, if the government
established “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained”). Violations of most but not all constitutional rights are now subject to harmless-error analysis. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (“Although most constitutional errors have been held amenable to harmless-error analysis, some will always invalidate
the conviction.” (citations omitted)).
215. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (describing a structural defect as
“affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial
process itself”).
216. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 743 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) (noting that “when a petit jury has been selected
upon improper criteria or has been exposed to prejudicial publicity, we have required reversal of
the conviction because the effect of the violation cannot be ascertained”); 2 LAFAVE, ISRAEL &
KING, supra note 160, § 27.6(d), at 471 (“Undoubtedly the characteristic of violations requiring
automatic reversal that is most frequently mentioned by the Supreme Court is the ‘inherently
indeterminate’ impact of the violation upon the outcome of the trial.”).
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structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself.”217 Conversely,
potentially harmless “trial defects” are those that “occur[ ] during
the presentation of the case to the jury.”218 In Riggins, the Supreme
Court suggested that compelling a defendant to take psychotropic
medications is not subject to harmless error analysis.219 For the
same reasons that the prejudice resulting from administering involuntary psychotropic medications cannot be considered harmless
after trial, this prejudice cannot be cured during trial: because altering the defendant’s demeanor will affect the jury in ways that
are difficult, if not impossible, to describe precisely, yet are almost
certain to influence the jury’s verdict in one way or another, neither
the instructions of a judge, the testimony of witnesses, nor the introduction of any other kind of evidence can, with adequate certainty, cure the prejudice resulting from the defendant’s druginduced demeanor.
3. Altered Evidence of Mental State
The impact of involuntary psychotropic medications on a defendant’s ability to present evidence in support of a claim that he
was insane at the time of the offense is also an evidentiary problem
that might potentially be cured by jury instructions or additional
evidence. Perhaps the most obvious means of compensating for the
loss of evidence that occurs when an irrational, psychotic detainee
is medicated into a rational, competent defendant220 would be to

217. Olano, 507 U.S. at 743 (quoting Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 263-64).
218. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08 (defining “trial error” as “error which occurred during
the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in
the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”).
219. 504 U.S. 127, 137 (1992) (indicating that “[e]fforts to prove or disprove actual prejudice
from the record before us would be futile, and guesses whether the outcome of the trial might
have been different if Riggins’[s] motion had been granted would be purely speculative” and “the
precise consequences of forcing antipsychotic medication upon Riggins cannot be shown from a
trial transcript” (citations omitted)); see also Castillo v. Stainer, 997 F.2d 669, 669 (9th Cir. 1993)
(“[The case of] Riggins v. Nevada . . . held that harmless error analysis should not be applied
where the defendant had been involuntarily medicated throughout the trial.”); Rickman v. Dutton, 864 F. Supp. 686, 714 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (holding that “because efforts to prove or disprove
actual prejudice from the record before the Court would be ‘futile,’ and the precise consequences
of compelling Rickman to take mind-numbing drugs ‘cannot be shown from a trial transcript,’ the
Court is foreclosed from conducting harmless error review” (quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137)).
220. Of course, that a defendant is rational at trial does not mean that he was sane (or insane) at the time of the crime. However, a jury may well find it harder to believe that a defendant who looks sane at trial was insane at the time of the crime. See supra notes 183-86 and
accompanying text. Additionally, the manner and substance of the defendant’s testimony at trial
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present to the jury some kind of record, such as a videotape, of the
defendant made prior to initiating medication.221 Relying on a
videotape to enable the defense to present evidence of insanity,
however, raises several concerns. First, if a detainee’s best evidence
supporting an insanity defense will be a videotape, then the tape
becomes very important. Perhaps defense counsel should be present
while the tape is being made, to ask those questions that will most
fully reveal the detainee’s insanity.222 But, if defense counsel can
question the detainee, then the prosecutor will likely want to question him as well. Arguably, if attorneys for the defense and the
prosecution are questioning the detainee, the detainee is being tried
while incompetent.223 Further, what if the detainee refuses to cooperate? Will this be held against him, even though he is incompetent
to stand trial? Arguably, any policy whereby an incompetent detainee can preserve the ability to present a defense only by producing an evidentiary record of his unmedicated mental state is inconsistent with the principle that a defendant cannot be tried unless
he is able to participate in defending himself.224
Another means by which a medicated defendant might support a defense of insanity is discontinuing the medications for a
brief period during trial. Although a few courts have granted a defendant’s request to discontinue involuntary psychotropic medica-

about his mental state at the time of the crime can influence whether the jury believes he was
insane at the time of the crime. See supra notes 180-182 and accompanying text.
221. See United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring)
(“[A]n effective insanity defense might be presented through the testimony of Dr. Johnson, perhaps assisted by videotapes of Weston. On remand, therefore, the district court should review the
tapes to determine whether they show Weston in his delusional state, and if so, whether, when
combined with psychiatric testimony, they would enable defense counsel to mount an effective
insanity defense.”).
222. Courts have generally held that a psychiatric evaluation, when requested by the prosecution for the purpose of obtaining evidence with which to counter the defendant’s claim of insanity, is not a “critical stage” entitling the defendant to the presence of counsel. See Buchanan v.
Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 424-25 (1987) (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not require the
presence of defense counsel during a prosecutor-requested psychiatric evaluation, so long as
defense counsel is “informed about the scope and nature of the proceeding” and “the possible uses
to which petitioner’s statements in the proceeding could be put”). A videotaped session that
would be the basis for the defendant’s entire defense, however, is arguably a “critical stage.” Cf.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (defining a “critical stage” as a proceeding
“where the results might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality”).
223. On the other hand, the absence of court involvement in the making of the tape might result in questions about the tape’s admissibility. See State v. Santos, 902 P.2d 510, 517 (Mont.
1995) (holding trial court was justified in refusing to admit videotapes of the defendant in an
unmedicated state in part because “[t]he probative value of the videotapes is suspect considering
the circumstances under which they were made, including that Santos was not under oath”).
224. See supra note 8 (discussing competency to stand trial).
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tions during at least part of the trial,225 this means of attempting to
overcome the prejudice caused by these medications is risky. No
way exists for predicting a defendant’s behavior while unmedicated,
and the defendant may become incompetent and may remain incompetent even when medications are again administered.226 Also,
discontinuing the medications does not necessarily mean that even
a previously psychotic defendant will experience a recurrence of
psychotic symptoms, or if psychotic symptoms do recur, that they
will be the same psychotic symptoms the defendant experienced at
the time of the offense.227 Finally, this option is only even theoretically possible when involuntary medications are not justified by the
defendant’s dangerousness, given the government’s interest in protecting the safety of the defendant and the people around the defendant, both in and out of the courtroom.228
B. Judicial Assessment of Medication Effects Cannot Protect
Against an Unfair Trial
Some courts seem to assume that any prejudice caused by
psychotropic medications will be addressed as a competency to
stand trial issue.229 The standard for assessing competency to stand

225. E.g., State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379, 1382 (N.H. 1978) (ruling that “the trial court may
compel the defendant to be under medication at least four weeks prior to trial . . . if at some time
during the trial, assuming the defendant so requests the jury views him without medication for
as long as he is found to have been without it at the time of the crime”).
226. See Richard Jed Wyatt, Neuroleptics and the Natural Course of Schizophrenia, 17
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 325, 325 (1991) (noting that “there is evidence that stable schizophrenic
patients whose neuroleptics are discontinued and have relapses may have a difficult time returning to their previous level of function”).
227. See JULIEN, supra note 101, at 345 (“Neuroleptic withdrawal can be followed by psychotic exacerbation or relapse, although not all patients relapse after medication withdrawal.”).
228. See supra note 24 (discussing government’s parens patriae and police power interests in
preventing harm). While handcuffing or otherwise restraining a defendant in the courtroom
might diminish the defendant’s dangerousness, compelling a defendant to appear before the jury
in physical restraints presents its own problems. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 264 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that if rendered competent by involuntary medication, the defendant “would not simply be thrust into the
courtroom for trial without additional procedural protections” but that “he would be statutorily
entitled to have a district judge conduct a pretrial examination of his competency to stand trial”);
see also William P. Ziegelmueller, Note, Sixth Amendment—Due Process on Drugs: The Implications of Forcibly Medicating Pretrial Detainees with Antipsychotic Drugs: Riggins v. Nevada, 112
S. Ct. 1810 (1992), 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 836, 865 (1993) (arguing that the majority
opinion in Riggins “ignored the fact that a defendant on antipsychotic drugs must still be competent to stand trial. The test to determine competency specifically determines if the defendant has
the cognitive capability to consult with her lawyer and follow the proceedings against her—the
very abilities the Court believed could be affected by antipsychotic drugs.”). A court is required to
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trial is not, however, adequate for preventing violations of the right
to a fair trial when the defendant is compelled to take psychotropic
drugs during trial. Courts interpret the competency to stand trial
standard very narrowly, as requiring only a basic cognitive ability
to understand and assist in the proceedings.230 This narrow interpretation means that drug-induced impairments in a defendant’s
emotional, motivational, attentional, or behavioral ability to participate are unlikely even to trigger a review of the defendant’s
competency to stand trial, much less support a finding of incompetence.231
Several courts have suggested that in addition to the usual
competency to stand trial review, a broader judicial assessment of
the medication effects and side effects experienced by the defendant
can protect the trial rights of a defendant to whom the government
is administering involuntary medications.232 What sort of standard
investigate any bona fide doubts about the defendant’s competency, at any time during the trial.
See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-87 (1966).
230. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993) (“Requiring that a criminal defendant
be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the
proceedings and to assist counsel.”); see also GARY MELTON, JOHN PETRILA, NORMAN POYTHRESS
& CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 122 (1997) (noting
that “most observers agree that the threshold for a finding of competency is not particularly
high”). Arguably, this standard does what it is supposed to do in most cases: it ensures that the
defendant has a sufficient understanding of the trial process to allow him to participate in presenting a defense. See supra note 8. This standard cannot, however, guard against an unfair trial
when the government, at the same time that it is prosecuting the defendant, is administering
medications known to impair the ability to present a defense. See supra Part III.B (discussing
ways that involuntary psychotropic medications interfere with the ability to present a defense).
231. Courts are likely to allow a trial to proceed despite evidence of significant impairment
caused by psychotropic medications, provided the impairment does not include an inability to
understand the trial process. See, e.g., McGregor v. Gibson, 219 F.3d 1245, 1252, 1259 n.3, 1261
(10th Cir. 2000) (finding that defendant’s “conduct and demeanor at trial were not so bizarre and
irrational as to raise a bona fide doubt that he was incompetent,” when defendant may have been
overmedicated and defense attorney indicated that defendant “talked nonsense the whole time”
and hindered efforts to present a defense); State v. Mitchell, 727 N.E.2d 254, 269 (Ill. 2000) (emphasizing that motivational or attentional side effects of psychotropic medications do not raise a
bona fide doubt regarding competency; and that competency requires only that defendant’s cognitive abilities not be substantially impaired: “[Consultant’s] affidavit established that the combination of defendant’s medications might have affected defendant’s ability to make certain decisions . . . [and] may have caused defendant to appear too relaxed or detached during court proceedings. [The] affidavit simply does not establish that defendant would not have been able to
understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings or to assist in his defense.”); Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 441 (Mass. 1983) (concluding defendant was competent to
stand trial even though the symptoms of schizophrenia were only “controlled to some extent” by
“heavy” doses of antipsychotics, which “reduced the defendant’s alertness and ability to concentrate”).
232. E.g., United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring)
(stating that involuntary medications might be acceptable “provided that, should Weston become
competent to stand trial, the district court conducts a second hearing to determine the extent to
which any side effects Weston is actually experiencing might affect his fair trial rights”); United
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a court should apply to evaluate whether the prejudicial effects of
involuntary psychotropic drugs are within some acceptable range is,
however, something of a mystery. How sedated is too sedated to receive effective assistance of counsel? How distracted is too distracted to confront witnesses? How anxious is too anxious to convey
credibility? The problem, it should be emphasized, is not the defendant’s sedation, distractedness, or anxiety per se, but rather the
government action of causing the defendant to be sedated, distracted, or anxious.233 Also, a court would almost certainly have
great difficulty determining whether a particular defendant was
sedated, distracted, or anxious because of the effects and side effects of involuntary medications, or because of some other factor,
such as residual symptoms of the defendant’s mental illness or the
defendant’s personality.234 Finally, the effects and side effects of

States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115, 137 (D.D.C. 2001) (“The Court will reassess, upon request,
its determination regarding the prejudice to Weston’s fair trial rights resulting from medication
when testimony about the actual, not hypothetical, impact of the medication is available.”); Morgan, 193 F.3d at 264-65 (“The district judge might also ensure that the medication posed no
significant risk of altering or impairing Morgan’s demeanor in a manner that would prejudice his
capacity or willingness to either react to testimony at trial or to assist his counsel.”).
233. In Weston, Judge Tatel, responding to Judge Henderson’s suggestion that the inability
of an involuntarily medicated defendant to present evidence of insanity is no different from a
defendant’s inability to recreate a state of “heat of passion” for the jury, stressed that the critical
factor is whether the inability results from government action:
To be sure, due process does not require that a defendant presenting a “heat of
passion” defense “duplicate his ‘hot blood’ in court.” But because such a case involves no action by the government, it has nothing to do with the issue before
us. Here the question is whether due process permits the government through
involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs to alter the defendant so that
it becomes impossible for him to appear before the jury as he was when he
committed the crime.
Weston, 206 F.3d at 21-22 (Tatel, J., concurring) (quoting Weston, 206 F.3d at 15 (Henderson, J.,
concurring)).
Additionally, the “heat of passion” defense rests on a view of human nature as generally
flawed, so that any reasonable person experiencing what the defendant experienced would have
been similarly provoked. See State v. Thornton, 730 S.W.2d 309, 315 (Tenn. 1987) (setting aside
first-degree murder conviction in favor of manslaughter because “[i]n our opinion the passions of
any reasonable person would have been inflamed”); see also Glanville Williams, Provocation and
the Reasonable Man, 1954 CRIM. L. REV. 740, 742 (“Surely the true view of provocation is that it
is a concession to ‘the frailty of human nature’ in those exceptional cases where the legal prohibition fails of effect.”), quoted in KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 164, at 408. The insanity
defense, on the other hand, excuses someone whose experience of the world is so distorted that
he does not realize when he is killing someone else, or does not realize that killing someone else
is wrong. See M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843) (establishing the traditional definition of insanity). Arguably, from the typical juror’s point of view, it is much easier to imagine
being provoked enough to kill someone than it is to imagine being insane enough to kill someone.
Consequently, the inability to demonstrate to the jury a state of insanity is arguably more costly
to a defendant than is an inability to demonstrate a state of “heat of passion.”
234. See supra notes 198, 204 (discussing the problem of distinguishing medication effects
from other factors that could explain the defendant’s appearance and behavior).
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antipsychotic medications are so extensive that arguably the rights
of every defendant who takes these medications will be affected in
some way or another.235 For example, if the defendant experiences
extrapyramidal side effects and appears nervous,236 then the jury
may conclude that he lacks credibility;237 on the other hand, if the
defendant experiences no side effects and appears perfectly sane,238
then the jury may be unable to believe that he suffered from a mental abnormality at the time of the offense.239
V. THE BOTTOM LINE: CIVIL COMMITMENT RATHER THAN
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
The inability to cure the prejudice caused by psychotropic
medications means that courts should not allow the government to
compel a defendant to take these medications during trial. The conclusion that administering involuntary psychotropic medications
during trial violates the defendant’s right to a fair trial might be
criticized for giving an incompetent detainee the option of not proceeding to trial, by refusing to take voluntarily the psychotropic
drugs that might render him competent.240 The detainee’s “choice,”

235. See supra Part III.B (discussing ways that antipsychotic medications infringe rights at
trial).
236. See supra notes 118-20, 132 and accompanying text (discussing extrapyramidal side effects of antipsychotic medications).
237. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing impact of side effects on jury’s
assessment of defendant’s credibility).
238. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (noting some patients’ “wakening” response
to antipsychotic medications).
239. See supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text (discussing impact of antipsychotic medication on the ability to present evidence in support of insanity defense). This problem exists not
only for defendants asserting a traditional insanity defense but also for defendants asserting
defenses such as partial responsibility and diminished capacity. See supra notes 168-69 and
accompanying text (discussing partial responsibility and diminished capacity defenses).
240. On the other hand, the present system forces an incompetent detainee to choose between receiving treatment for his mental illness and receiving a fair adjudication of the charges
against him. Additionally, not all incompetent detainees will refuse psychotropic medications.
Particularly for detainees charged with relatively nonserious crimes, the prospect of a trial may
be more desirable than the prospect of indefinite civil commitment. When antipsychotic drugs
were first introduced, some courts initially found detainees incompetent to stand trial if their
competency was maintained by medication; some of these detainees appealed, seeking to be able
to proceed to trial. E.g., State v. Hampton, 218 So.2d 311, 312 (La. 1969) (finding on appeal by
defendant that trial court erred in ruling that “trial capacity induced by medication was insufficient”); People v. Dalfonso, 321 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (agreeing with defendant’s
argument that he was “competent to stand trial even though his competency may depend upon
taking the prescribed medication, Haldol”); see also Steve Tomashefsky, Comment, Antipsychotic
Drugs and Fitness to Stand Trial: The Right of the Unfit Accused to Refuse Treatment, 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 773, 791 (1985) (“[I]t should not be assumed that a defendant is automatically better off
being found unfit to stand trial than being tried. The early litigation over fitness produced by
antipsychotic drugs was instigated by defendants who preferred a trial to indefinite commit-
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however, is not between trial and release. If a detainee refuses to
take psychotropic medications voluntarily, then the government can
seek to hold the detainee under civil commitment laws.241 Different
jurisdictions have different criteria for civil commitment, yet all
provide in some way for the detention of someone who is a danger to
himself or others because of a mental illness.242 Some statutes are
even specifically designed to address the problem of the “permanently incompetent” detainee, who cannot be brought to trial.243 For
example, federal law allows for the indefinite commitment of an
incompetent detainee “against whom all criminal charges have been
dismissed solely for reasons related to the mental condition of the
person” if the detainee “is presently suffering from a mental disease
or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial
risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another.”244 Thus, although not all incompetent detainees
who refuse medication will satisfy the requirements for civil commitment, the government should have the greatest ability to hold

ment.”). Even those who have been convicted may not prefer involuntary psychiatric treatment
over regular penal confinement. See generally Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (involving a
convicted felon’s objection to being transferred from the state prison to a mental hospital). Additionally, when an incompetent detainee is charged with a relatively minor crime, the prosecutor
may be sympathetic to some resolution of the charge, such as entering a nolle prosequi, so that
the detainee can receive appropriate treatment. Problems arise when the detainee is charged
with a serious crime, because the public pressure to obtain a conviction may diminish the prosecutor’s willingness to take any action other than to proceed to trial. Interview with Karl Dean,
former Public Defender and present Director of Law for Metropolitan Nashville, in Nashville,
Tenn. (Nov. 15, 2001).
241. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (noting that one of the government’s
options when a detainee cannot be rendered competent to stand trial is to “institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen”); cf. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 145 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“If the State cannot render the defendant competent without involuntary medication, then it
must resort to civil commitment, if appropriate, unless the defendant becomes competent
through other means.”).
242. See REISNER, SLOBOGIN & RAI, supra note 170, at 641 (discussing civil commitment
statutes).
243. Usually, a detainee is “permanently incompetent” because his incompetence results
from a mental disorder that cannot be treated. “[I]f there is no substantial probability that the
defendant will regain trial competence in the near future . . . the state can only justify further
detention through the use of its regular civil commitment proceedings. The incompetent defendant is then viewed as permanently incompetent, not as potentially restorable.” Grant H. Morris
& J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 13 (1993) (footnote omitted).
244. 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998); see also United States v. Sahhar, 56 F.3d 1026,
1029-30 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the constitutionality of § 4246, on the grounds that it “is narrowly tailored to apply only to a particular concern of the federal government: dangerous persons
charged with federal crimes but found incompetent to stand trial”), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 952
(1995).
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those detainees who pose the greatest risk of engaging in criminal
activity if released.245 If the government cannot hold a detainee who
is so seriously mentally ill as to not satisfy the very minimal requirements for competency to stand trial,246 and who, probable
cause exists to believe, is endangering himself and others by engaging in criminal activity, then arguably the solution should be to
change the civil commitment laws, not to compromise constitutional
guarantees of fairness for the sake of obtaining a criminal conviction. Furthermore, the difficult questions247 that arise when the
government seeks to administer involuntary psychotropic drugs to
an incompetent pretrial detainee might well be avoided altogether,
in at least some cases, by a different kind of change in the civil
commitment laws: enhancing the government’s ability to administer involuntary psychotropic drugs to a mentally ill person before
he commits a crime.248

245. See Morris & Meloy, supra note 243, at 22 (“Throughout the United States, a mentally
disordered person who is dangerous to others is subject to civil commitment. In a civil commitment proceeding, proof that a permanently incompetent defendant recently engaged in serious
activity endangering others should suffice for an order of commitment.”). Additionally, if the
requirements for civil commitment are not met, the government may in extreme cases seek to
continue holding the detainee under an alternate exercise of the government’s police power interest in protecting the safety of the public. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748
(1987) (“We have repeatedly held that the Government’s regulatory interest in community safety
can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest.”).
246. See supra note 8 (discussing competency to stand trial); see also supra notes 230-31 and
accompanying text (stressing that the requirements for competence to stand trial are minimal).
247. See supra Part II (discussing difficulty courts have encountered in determining when
the government may administer involuntary medications); see also United States v. Weston, 206
F.3d 9, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Rogers, J., concurring) (“[N]otwithstanding the district court’s commendable effort to get a handle on a difficult issue, the district court made insufficient findings
and did not consider all of the factors.”); State v. Garcia, 658 A.2d 947, 971 (Conn. 1975) (indicating that “the trial court made an admirable attempt, in the absence of guidance on this complex
issue, to balance the interests of the defendant and the state before issuing the medication order”).
248. See Ken Kress, An Argument for Assisted Outpatient Treatment for Persons with Serious
Mental Illness Illustrated with Reference to a Proposed Statute for Iowa, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1269,
1285 (2000) (“Numerous studies conclude that persons suffering from mental illness who follow
prescribed medication regimens, or are properly treated, are significantly less dangerous than
those who are not treated or who are noncompliant with prescribed medication regimens.”); E.
Fuller Torrey, M.D., Violent Behavior by Individuals with Serious Mental Illness, 45 HOSP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 653, 659 (1994) (“The data, then, suggest that individuals with serious
mental illnesses are not more dangerous than the general population when they are taking their
antipsychotic medication. When they are not taking their medication, the existing data suggest
that some of them are more dangerous.”); Letters from Nobody: The Shadow of Russell Weston,
Jr., ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Aug. 8, 2001, at B8 (commenting on the possibility of imposing
the death penalty in the Weston case):
If society can forcibly medicate a man to kill him, why can’t it forcibly medicate
a man to save him? Why did John Gibson and Jacob Chestnut have to give up
their lives before the law stepped in? Why are we debating the absurdist, the
Kafkaesque, question of whether to make a man sane enough to kill him, or to
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Civil commitment does not, of course, achieve the same interests as does a criminal conviction.249 The two primary interests
that the government can achieve through criminal convictions are
retribution and deterrence.250 These particular interests are not
well served, however, by the conviction of someone who has been
denied a fair opportunity to defend himself. The theory of retribution is based on the principle that a defendant who is convicted of a
crime deserves to be punished.251 This principle presumes, however,
that the defendant deserved to be convicted, a presumption that is
not warranted when the defendant did not receive a fair trial. Similarly, the government could obtain more convictions, and thereby
deter more potential criminals, by compromising the procedural
protections afforded by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.252 That
these amendments grant to criminal defendants such rights as the
right to remain silent, to consult with an attorney, and to confront
witnesses—rights that certainly tend to impair rather than enhance
the government’s ability to obtain convictions and deter crime—
indicates that deterrence cannot be achieved, legitimately at
least,253 by sacrificing a basic level of fairness.
While most defendants can be tried according to the rules of
fairness established by the Constitution, in some cases these rules
will preclude bringing a defendant to trial, because the trial would
lack a basic level of fairness. Thus, for example, the inability to
render a detainee competent to stand trial does not justify bringing
the detainee to trial while he is incompetent.254 Similarly, the inability to bring a defendant to trial if the court suppresses the defendant’s coerced confession, or evidence obtained by the police in

leave him to his madness? Isn’t there some other way, some sane way to treat
the insane? Or has society gone mad, too?
249. See United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 881-82 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
250. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (observing that “punishment
serves the twin aims of retribution and deterrence” (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 168 (1963))).
251. See Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER
AND EMOTIONS 179 (F. Schoeman ed., 1987) (“Retributivism is the view that punishment is justified by the moral culpability of those who receive it. A retributivist punishes because, and only
because, the offender deserves it.”), quoted in KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 164, at 106.
252. The protections guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are discussed supra
Part III.B.
253. Cf. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985) (“[A] state may not legitimately assert an
interest in maintenance of a strategic advantage over the defense, if the result of that advantage
is to cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict obtained.”)
254. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (“The State concedes that the conviction
of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process.” (citing Bishop v.
United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956))).
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an illegal search, does not justify admitting the coerced confession255 or the illegally obtained evidence.256 Finally, maintaining a
basic level of fairness is an interest of the government as well as of
defendants.257 Convicting a defendant after an unfair trial not only
harms the individual defendant but also compromises the integrity
of the criminal justice system as a whole.258
VI. CONCLUSION
In deciding whether to allow the government to administer
involuntary psychotropic medications to an incompetent pretrial
detainee, a court must consider multiple interests of both the government and the detainee. Either way that a court decides, the ability to achieve certain of these interests will be limited, if not foreclosed altogether. If the court decides not to allow involuntary
medications, the government will likely be unable to achieve its interest in adjudicating the charges against the detainee. The government also might need to pursue civil commitment to achieve its
interests in protecting the health and safety of the detainee and
others. On the other hand, if the court decides to allow involuntary
medications, the detainee’s ability to exercise procedural rights at
trial will likely be diminished. Also, the detainee’s demeanor as
well as his mental state are likely to be altered by the medications,
in ways that detract both from the jury’s impression of the de-

255. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964) (observing that “[i]t is now axiomatic
that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded,
in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession”); see also Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560,
568 (1958) (“[T]he admission in evidence, over objection, of the coerced confession vitiates the
judgment because it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
256. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in
a state court.”).
257. See United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 960 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[A] drug that negatively affects [the defendant’s] demeanor in court or ability to participate in his own defense will
not satisfy the government’s goal of a fair trial.” (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 143-44
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (emphasis added)); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
849 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting “the established principle that the interest of the
State in a criminal prosecution ‘is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done’ ”
(quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935))).
258. See United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 288 (S.D. Ala. 1906) (charging the jury that
convicting an incompetent defendant would be worse than allowing a competent defendant to go
unpunished because, in convicting an incompetent defendant, “the great safeguards which the
law adopts in the punishment of crime and the upholding of justice would be rudely invaded by
the tribunal whose sacred duty it is to uphold the law in all its integrity”), quoted in Cooper v.
Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 366 (1996).
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tainee’s character and credibility and from his ability to present
evidence in support of an insanity defense.
These infringements of the detainee’s interests create a substantial risk that a detainee to whom the government is administering involuntary psychotropic medications will not receive a fair
trial. Because the detainee cannot be tried with a reasonable certainty of fairness, he cannot be tried at all. This is true regardless
of the magnitude of the government interests that will not be
achieved because the detainee will not be brought to trial; the inability to conduct a trial fairly does not justify conducting a trial
unfairly. As important as the government’s interests in adjudication undeniably are, they cannot justify violating a detainee’s right
not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law.259 If the
government is considered not to violate due process by bringing a
detainee to trial while simultaneously compelling him to take psychotropic medications—medications that will impair his ability to
confront witnesses against him, for example, or will detract from a
jury’s perception of his credibility, or will alter the content of his
testimony—then for this detainee, the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, along with much of the Sixth
Amendment, have become essentially meaningless.
Dora W. Klein*

259. If the defendant is charged with a capital offense, administering involuntary psychotropic medications can also violate the right not to be deprived of life without due process of law. See
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 143-44 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[S]erious prejudice could
result if medication inhibits the defendant’s capacity to react and respond to the proceedings and
to demonstrate remorse or compassion. . . . In a capital sentencing proceeding, assessments of
character and remorse may carry great weight and, perhaps, be determinative of whether the
offender lives or dies.” (citing William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life
or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 51-53
(1987-1988))).
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